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The Realities of Electoral Reform
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*
Eric M. McGhee**
Steven Rogers***
What good are theories if they cannot be tested? Election law has
wrestled with this question over the last generation. Two new theories have
emerged during this period that reject conventional rights-and-interests
balancing. In its place, the responsiveness theory asserts that legislators’
positions should be sensitive to changes in the views of their constituents.
Similarly, the alignment theory claims that voters’ and legislators’ preferences
should be congruent.
Unfortunately, both of these theories share a common flaw: They
provide no way for anyone to tell whether electoral policies improve or worsen
responsiveness or alignment. They operate at too normative a level to be useful
to practically minded courts or policymakers. They are caught in clouds of
abstraction.
This Article is an attempt to pull the theories down from the clouds. In
the last few years, data has become available, for the first time, on voters’ and
legislators’ preferences at the state legislative level. We use this data to calculate
responsiveness and alignment for both individual legislators and whole
legislative chambers, across the country and over the last two decades. We also
pair these calculations with a new database of state electoral policies that covers
the areas of (1) franchise access, (2) party regulation, (3) campaign finance, (4)
redistricting, and (5) governmental structure. This pairing enables us to
estimate the policies’ actual effects on responsiveness and alignment.
Our results mean that laws’ representational impact now is a matter of
empirics, not conjecture. Courts that wish to decide cases in accordance with the
*
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This Article builds on our earlier legal and political science work on representation. It is
part of a larger project aimed at grasping, both in theory and in practice, how electoral reforms
affect core representational values. An earlier version of the Article was selected for presentation
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for their helpful comments. We also are pleased to acknowledge the support of the Robert Helman
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responsiveness or alignment theories may do so by consulting our findings.
Policymakers who aim to enact beneficial reforms may do the same. And
academics no longer have an excuse for debating the theories from a purely
normative perspective. Now that the “is” has been intertwined with the “ought,”
the “is” no longer may be ignored.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Two major theories of election law share a common flaw. They
both assert that electoral policies should be assessed based on whether
they promote or inhibit a certain kind of relationship between voters’
and representatives’ preferences. But neither theory offers any way to
tell whether policies actually produce this relationship. Neither theory,
that is, offers any practical guidance to courts or policymakers who wish
to heed its recommendations.
Take the responsiveness theory that Sam Issacharoff and Rick
Pildes pioneered, and that is now the dominant approach in the election
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law literature. 1 The theory contends that officeholders’ positions should
be responsive to the views of their constituents. If the constituents’
preferences shift in a particular direction, then so should the
officeholders’ preferences. But how are we supposed to know whether a
given policy—a photo-identification requirement, say, or a limit on
campaign contributions—increases or decreases responsiveness? How
are we supposed to operationalize the value that Issacharoff and Pildes
have identified? Unfortunately, the theory provides no answer. 2
Or take the alignment theory that many political scientists
endorse, and that one of us has applied to election law in earlier work. 3
The theory argues that representatives’ positions should be congruent
with voters’ views. If voters hold certain preferences, then so should
their representatives. But how do we figure out whether a given
reform—an open primary, say, or an independent redistricting
commission—is aligning or misaligning? How do we convert the
abstract ideal of preference congruence into usable instructions for
judges and legislators? Again, alas, the theory comes up empty.
To be fair, this flaw in the responsiveness and alignment
theories was unavoidable until very recently. To determine the effects
of different electoral policies, it is necessary to have (1) substantial
policy variation across time and space, (2) a measure of voters’

1.
For some of the key articulations of the theory, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering
and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 630 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 717 (1998);
and Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term: Foreword: The Constitutionalization of
Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 40 (2004). For a sense of the theory’s centrality in the
election law literature, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 139
(2003) (“The Issacharoff-Pildes model is becoming the new election law orthodoxy . . . .”); Joseph
Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011)
(describing the “emerging consensus” in favor of the Issacharoff-Pildes approach); and Nathaniel
Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to IncumbentProtecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 651 (2002) (noting how “attention in the field has
shifted . . . toward an emphasis on electoral competition”).
2.
Other scholars who have made this point include Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination
Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411, 1423 (2008) (“[I]t is difficult to
ascertain when the right level of partisan competition has been achieved.”) and Daniel A. Farber,
Implementing Equality, 3 ELECTION L.J. 371, 376 (2004) (observing that “structural considerations
are difficult to manage”).
3.
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 304
(2014); see also, e.g., Andrew Rehfield, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and
Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 214,
219 (2009) (“The reigning view within empirical political science presumes the delegate model of
representation as the ideal.”); Andrew Sabl, Preference, Policies, and Democratic Quality: The
Empirical-Normative Divide 6 (Apr. 3, 2014) (unpublished paper) (on file with authors) (discussing
many “empirical researchers asserting that democratic theory implies congruence”).
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preferences, and (3) a measure of legislators’ preferences. 4 At the
congressional level, data on voters’ and legislators’ preferences has long
been available, but there is insufficient policy variation to come to any
robust conclusions. Too many rules are set federally and thus do not
differ year by year or state by state. 5 At the state legislative level,
conversely, states have experimented with all sorts of electoral policies,
but in the past there was little data on voters’ or legislators’ preferences.
The districts were too small and the politicians too obscure for much
information to be gathered.
This situation has changed dramatically over the past few years.
As to voters’ preferences, a pair of political scientists merged a series of
surveys and then used a new statistical technique to produce public
opinion estimates at the state legislative district level. 6 One of us also
compiled presidential election results aggregated by state legislative
district for a substantial number of prior elections. 7 As to legislators’
preferences, another pair of political scientists assembled roll call
voting data for all fifty states and then used this information to
calculate state legislator ideal points. 8 Still another political scientist
estimated state legislators’ ideologies by analyzing the identities of
their campaign donors. 9 Lastly, we perused an array of primary and
secondary sources in order to code several dozen state electoral policies
over a two-decade period. Our database, the most extensive of its kind,
includes policies in the areas of (1) franchise access, (2) party
regulation, (3) campaign finance, (4) redistricting, and (5) governmental
structure.
Armed with this newly available data, we seek in this Article to
redress the empirical deficiencies of the responsiveness and alignment
theories. We seek, in other words, to determine what the implications
of different electoral policies actually are for responsiveness and

4.
It also is helpful to have a large number of cases to study. While there are only 435
congressional districts in the country, there are more than seven thousand state legislative
districts—a much more suitable data universe for state-level analysis.
5.
This is most true with respect to campaign finance and governmental structure policies.
6.
See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy
Preferences in Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL. 330, 330 (2013) (acquiring pool
of 275,000 respondents by merging surveys).
7.
This was Rogers. See Eric M. McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship?
Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 337, 341–47 (2014) (using this
data).
8.
See Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530, 532–49 (2011).
9.
See Adam Bonica, Mapping the Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 368–82
(2014). However, as we discuss infra Part III.A, we are unable to use Bonica’s estimates in our
analysis because of their lower reliability at the state legislative level.
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alignment. We carry out our analysis at the levels of both the state
legislative district and the state legislative chamber. This dual
approach allows us to investigate both dyadic representation (i.e., the
relationship between a particular legislator and her constituents) and
collective representation (i.e., the relationship between an entire
legislative body and all of the voters in the state). 10 We also carry out
our analysis over the 1992–2013 period and across all fifty states. 11 This
wide temporal and spatial lens takes full advantage of the states’ policy
variation and enhances our ability to reach conclusions about causality.
At the dyadic level, we find that most state legislators are
misaligned with their constituents. Democrats typically are too liberal
for their districts’ voters, while Republicans typically are too
conservative. This misalignment also is asymmetric. Republicans tend
to be more misaligned than Democrats, and their level of misalignment
has risen in recent years (while that of Democrats has fallen). At the
collective level, both alignment and responsiveness vary markedly from
state to state, but not very much from year to year. The median
legislator also is too liberal in states governed by Democrats, and too
conservative in Republican-run states. And the median legislator is
positively responsive to changes in public opinion in most states, but
swings in the opposite direction from the electorate in a handful of
outliers.
Turning to the electoral policies that are the Article’s focus, we
find that several of them have positive effects on alignment and
responsiveness, even with rigorous controls included in our models. For
example, limits on individual campaign contributions improve
alignment at the district level, likely because the donors whose giving
is constrained tend to be ideologically extreme. Similarly, the use of an
independent commission to draw district lines improves alignment at
the chamber level, probably because a commission (unlike politicians)
has no incentive to gerrymander. And sore loser laws, which ban
candidates who lose in the primaries from running again in the general
election, improve alignment at both the district and chamber levels.
This effect may arise due to defeated candidates seeking a second bite
at the apple, and thus splitting their party’s vote, in the absence of these
laws.
However, the story is not as rosy for all of the policies we
examine. For instance, certain types of open primaries worsen both
10. See Robert Weissberg, Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 535, 535–37 (1978).
11. The one minor exception is that we study only chamber-level responsiveness in
Nebraska, since its legislators do not have official partisan affiliations.

766

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:761

alignment and responsiveness, likely because they fail to attract more
moderate voters to the polls. Likewise, public financing schemes are
misaligning at the district level, probably because the public funds tend
to be tied to donations from polarized individual donors. Term limits
also reduce district-level alignment, as term-limited legislators
evidently represent their constituents less ably. And policies that
restrict access to the franchise (such as photo-identification
requirements) have little discernible impact on alignment. They may
influence turnout, but they do not seem to affect representation.
Our findings have important implications for courts,
policymakers, and academics alike. Courts, first, may consult our
results to evaluate claims that policies should be upheld because they
promote alignment or responsiveness. 12 Courts have struggled with
these claims in the past, but now arguments about how policies affect
representation may be assessed empirically rather than intuitively.
Our findings also bolster certain judicial doctrines while undermining
others. For example, courts’ tendency to uphold franchise restrictions 13
seems acceptable given their minor impact on alignment; and courts’
aggressive scrutiny of open primaries 14 may be sensible too given their
negative effects on alignment and responsiveness. But courts should be
more tolerant of limits on individual donors, 15 which increase
alignment, and should prod states more forcefully to adopt redistricting
commissions, 16 which are aligning as well.
Next, policymakers who hope to improve representation may
draw on our results to identify policies that serve this goal (and to avoid
policies that do not). The areas in which representational gains are most
attainable, in our view, are campaign finance and redistricting. 17
Several reforms in these areas produce benefits in both district- and
12. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that address alignment, see Stephanopoulos,
supra note 3, at 316–20. For a similar discussion focused on responsiveness, see Issacharoff, supra
note 1, at 605–06.
13. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (plurality
opinion) (upholding Indiana photo-identification requirement).
14. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (voiding California
blanket primary).
15. Instead, the Court has struck down limits on individual expenditures, see Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976), on aggregate individual contributions, see McCutcheon v. FEC,
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion), and on certain nonaggregate individual
contributions, see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262–63 (2006).
16. Instead, the Court has upheld egregious gerrymanders enacted by the elected branches.
See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006) (rejecting
“challenge to Texas’s redistricting as an unconstitutional political gerrymander”); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (holding political gerrymandering challenge against
Pennsylvania nonjusticiable).
17. Sore loser laws also are aligning, but they already are in place in most states.
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chamber-level alignment. These reforms should be a high priority for
leaders who want American democracy to function more effectively.
Conversely, there is less reason for these leaders to devote their
energies to franchise access, party regulation, or governmental
structure. Most franchise access laws only influence representation at
the margins, while several common reforms of party regulation and
governmental structure are misaligning. In these areas, inaction, or
even the repeal of existing rules, is preferable to new regulatory
activity. 18
Lastly, our analysis gives rise to both a research agenda for
political scientists and theoretical insights for legal academics. Among
the many worthwhile sequels that political scientists should consider
are: generating reliable measures of legislator ideology that vary over
time, coding electoral policies in nonbinary fashion, and using voter
surveys to place voters’ and state legislators’ ideal points on the same
scale. Law professors tend not to perform such quantitative work, but
our results also should be valuable to them due to the light they shed
on the alignment and responsiveness theories. For one thing, it now is
possible to apply the theories—to determine with some confidence how
different policies affect representation. This is a major milestone in the
theories’ evolution. For another, it turns out that the responsiveness
theory is much less useful in practice than the alignment theory. Far
fewer policies have any impact on responsiveness, meaning that it
usually cannot be used to distinguish sound from unsound reforms.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides the theoretical
backdrop for our empirical investigation. It articulates the
responsiveness and alignment theories, summarizes the existing
literature on the theories, and identifies certain gaps in this literature.
Part III, the analytical core of the Article, presents our findings on the
effects of different electoral policies on responsiveness and alignment.
It describes the data we use, explains our methodological choices, and
sets forth the results of our various models. Lastly, Part IV considers
what our conclusions mean for courts, policymakers, and academics. It
argues that all three sets of actors must rethink their approaches to
election law if they hope to construct a responsive and aligned political
system.
One more prefatory note: This Article is far from the last word
on how electoral policies affect representation. In fact, it is more like
the first word. All of the datasets we rely on are very new and surely
will be refined in the future. In addition, a single paper cannot possibly
18. We decline to comment on what reforms should be pursued by policymakers who
affirmatively want misalignment in their favor.
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assess with sufficient rigor several dozen policies spanning five distinct
areas. We believe our analytical techniques are valid and generate
reliable results. We also believe there is value in breadth of coverage,
in seeking to evaluate simultaneously a range of reforms. But we
recognize that more work is necessary before our findings can be seen
as definitive and not merely suggestive. In fact, we plan to do a good
deal of this work ourselves as we continue to execute the project that
this Article commences.
II. THEORETICAL BACKDROP
Before delving into empirics, it is important to say a few words
about the election law theories whose weaknesses we hope to rectify.
We open this Part, then, by outlining the key elements of the
responsiveness and alignment theories. Both theories are structuralist,
in the argot of election law scholars, because they emphasize structural
features of our political system rather than individual rights claims.
Both theories are concerned as well with achieving a certain kind of
relationship between voters’ and representatives’ preferences—a
responsive relationship in one case and a congruent relationship in the
other.
Next, we summarize the existing political science literature on
the impact of different electoral policies on responsiveness and
alignment. A number of studies do attempt to quantify these concepts
and to analyze their linkages to electoral rules. Unfortunately, as we
further explain in this Part, most of these efforts are deficient in
significant respects. Very few studies to date have succeeded in
measuring both voters’ and representatives’ preferences at the level—
the state legislative—at which the greatest policy variation arises. As a
result, current scholarship does not provide courts and policymakers
with the necessary tools to operationalize the responsiveness and
alignment theories.
A. Responsiveness and Alignment
In recent years, the central cleavage in election law has pitted
rights-oriented against structuralist theories. 19 In one camp are
scholars who argue (along with some Supreme Court Justices) that the
rights burdens imposed by electoral regulations should be balanced
19. For some of the abundant literature on this cleavage, see HASEN, supra note 1; Guy-Uriel
Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (2005) (reviewing HASEN, supra note
1); Dawood, supra note 2; Fishkin, supra note 1; and Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political
Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999).
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against the state interests that the regulations serve. 20 The burdens
should be permitted only if they are less substantial than the gains for
the countervailing interests. In the opposite corner are commentators
who maintain that such rights-and-interests balancing ignores the
structural dynamics that are truly at stake in electoral disputes. 21
These dynamics, summarized by Pildes as “the interlocking
relationships of the institutions . . . that organize the democratic
system,” 22 should be the focus of judges as well as legislators.
The responsiveness and alignment theories that are the subject
of this Article both are structuralist approaches. 23 Both call attention
to democratic values that inhere in our political system as a whole, not
to individual rights such as speech or the franchise. To determine
whether a given policy is lawful or advisable, the theories advise that
its implications for the relevant democratic value be ascertained. Its
implications for individual rights—or for state interests unconnected to
the democratic value—are irrelevant.
Beginning with the responsiveness theory, some readers may be
puzzled by our label for it. Issacharoff and Pildes, the chief proponents
of the theory, are best known for their commitment to electoral
competition, not responsiveness. But they have made clear in numerous
works that they view competition as an instrumental rather than an
intrinsic value. The reason why they regard competition as desirable is
their belief that it tends to produce a responsive political order.
Responsiveness, not competition, is their ultimate aim. As they write in
a seminal article, “Only through an appropriately competitive partisan
environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be
realized: that . . . the political process be responsive to the interests and
views of citizens.” 24
20. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 292–95 (describing these scholars and Justices as
well as their arguments).
21. See id. at 295–98 (describing these commentators and their arguments).
22. Pildes, supra note 1, at 41.
23. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 19, at 1607 (“Professor Samuel Issacharoff and I attempt
to . . . develop[ ] one structural aim that the history of American law and democracy suggests
should be a particular focal point for courts.”); Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 299 (“Alignment
is a quintessential structural value—a value that matters to the entire polity, not to any particular
group or individual . . . .”).
24. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646; see also, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615
(“[C]ompetition [is] critical to the ability of voters to ensure the responsiveness of elected officials
to the voters’ interests . . . .”); Pildes, supra note 1, at 125 (describing as a key question for American
politics whether “parties will face sufficient competitive pressures to keep them appropriately
responsive to diverse interests”).
The other democratic value that Issacharoff and Pildes believe is advanced by
competition is accountability. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 623 (“[D]emocracy is defined
primarily by the accountability of the elected to the electors, an accountability that is in turn
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Unfortunately, Issacharoff and Pildes are not always clear as to
which output should be responsive to which input at which level. On
the output side, they refer at different times to elected officials’
“preferences,” 25 to “policy outcomes,” 26 and to “representation” itself. 27
On the input side, similarly, they mention the “interests of voters” 28 on
some occasions and the “preferences of the electorate” on others. 29 And
with respect to level, sometimes they argue that individual legislators
should be responsive to their own constituents, 30 and elsewhere they
claim that the entire political system should be responsive to all of the
voters in the jurisdiction. 31 Probably the fairest reading of their position
is that they want all of these outputs to be responsive to all of these
inputs at all of these levels. Legislators’ preferences and policy
outcomes should be responsive to voters’ preferences and interests
within particular districts and whole jurisdictions.
In contrast to the responsiveness theory, the alignment theory
is not concerned with the rate of change of some output given a shift in
some input. Instead, the theory asserts that the levels of the input and
of the output should correspond. At any moment in time,
notwithstanding whatever swings have occurred or will occur, the input
and the output should assume the same value along some common
metric. 32 (Of course, this means that alignment and responsiveness are

shaped through competitive elections.”); Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and RightsOriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 685, 688 (2004) (“[O]f the various structural goals of
democracy, the one courts ought to focus on is ensuring competition and, through it, electoral
accountability.”). We do not attempt to measure accountability in this Article.
25. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615, 628 n.139.
26. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646.
27. Id. at 649, 673.
28. Id. at 680.
29. Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 615.
30. See, e.g., id. at 615–16; Pildes, supra note 24, at 686 (“Elections also create ex ante
incentives for political candidates to be strategically responsive to enough voters to enable
candidates to turn themselves into officeholders . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 1, at 646 (noting that legislatures can be viewed
“as a managerial class, imperfectly accountable through periodic review to a diffuse body of equity
holders known as the electorate”); Pildes, supra note 1, at 42, 64 n.158.
32. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 301; see also, e.g., Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H.
Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 148 (2012) (“[B]y
responsiveness, we mean a positive correlation between opinion and policy; by congruence, we
mean that policy actually matches majority opinion.”); Boris Shor, Congruence, Responsiveness,
and Representation in American State Legislatures 2 (Aug. 25, 2014) (unpublished paper)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697352, archived at http://
perma.cc/GCT9-GNUT (noting that responsiveness “denotes the idea that legislators . . . respond
to their constituents’ policy preferences” while congruence requires that “the preferences of
constituents and the representative should match in some common metric”).
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related. A degree of responsiveness is necessary to achieve alignment
whenever an input changes. 33)
At least as one of us has articulated it, the alignment theory
offers a good deal of specificity as to which outputs should align with
which inputs at which levels. 34 In increasing order of ambitiousness,
the relevant outputs are (1) legislators’ partisan affiliations, i.e., the
party to which they belong; (2) legislators’ policy preferences, i.e., their
specific issue positions and overall ideologies; and (3) public policy
outcomes, i.e., the actual enactments of the elected branches. Also in
increasing order, the relevant inputs are (1) voters’ partisan
preferences, i.e., the party they would like to see in office; and (2) voters’
policy preferences, i.e., their specific issue positions and overall
ideologies. And alignment can be conceptualized at the levels of (1) the
individual district, in which the district’s representative and median
voter should align; and (2) the entire legislative chamber, in which the
body’s median member and the jurisdiction’s median voter should do so.
Putting these pieces together, we can construct a taxonomy of
alignment. 35 Partisan alignment refers to the congruence of legislators’
partisan affiliations and voters’ partisan preferences. Policy preference
alignment (preference alignment for short) denotes the correspondence
of legislators’ and voters’ policy positions. And policy outcome
alignment (outcome alignment for short) means that public policy
outcomes correspond to voters’ policy views. Moreover, all three types
of alignment apply to the levels of both the individual district and the
entire legislative chamber. (Though outcome alignment at the district
level is essentially irrelevant since so little policy is set by individual
constituencies.)
As we explain below, 36 we choose to focus on preference
alignment in this Article, at both the district and chamber levels. No
single project could possibly analyze how all of the forms of alignment
are related to all of the electoral rules that shape our political system.
Because of the imprecision of Issacharoff and Pildes’s account, we also
apply the taxonomy of alignment to responsiveness. We thus assess

33. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 301 n.81.
34. See id. at 304–13.
35. See id. Careful readers may note that our terminology is slightly different here than in
Stephanopoulos’s earlier work. What he previously called “policy alignment” we now refer to as
“preference alignment.”
36. See infra Part II.C. Of course, preference alignment is related to partisan alignment and
outcome alignment. Because each party’s legislators usually hold similar ideologies, partisan
alignment tends to lead to preference alignment. Similarly, because the median legislator is often
the pivotal legislator for purposes of policy enactment, preference alignment tends to lead to
outcome alignment. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 310–11.
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preference responsiveness—the rate of change of legislators’ policy
positions given shifts in voters’ policy views—at the chamber level.
Furthermore, we typically (though not exclusively 37) use the median
voter as our benchmark on the input side. We recognize that other
figures are normatively appealing too (such as the median person, the
median citizen, and the median eligible voter), but space and data
constraints prevent us from exploring here how well they are
represented. 38 While our methodological decisions exclude several
kinds of alignment and responsiveness from our study, we trust that
our findings still will be of substantial interest.
B. Prior Findings
Not surprisingly, the scholars who have advanced the
responsiveness and alignment theories have not themselves
investigated which electoral policies promote these values and which do
not. The scholars have drawn ably from the relevant academic
literature and historical record, but they have not carried out their own
empirical analysis. Democratic theory and quantitative inquiry seldom
mix.
However, a number of political scientists have explored the links
between electoral rules and the various kinds of responsiveness and
alignment. We summarize their findings here and critique them in the
next section. For the sake of simplicity, we organize our discussion by
the category of the rule: (1) franchise access, i.e., policies relating to the
ability to vote; (2) party regulation, i.e., policies relating to parties’
nominee selection and ballot access; (3) campaign finance, i.e., policies
relating to campaign contributions and expenditures; (4) redistricting,
i.e., policies relating to the drawing of electoral districts; and (5)
governmental structure, i.e., policies relating to the organization of the
elected branches. These categories capture essentially all of the rules
that constitute states’ electoral systems.
Starting with access to the franchise, several studies have
examined the consequences of restrictive policies for the partisan
composition of the electorate—a plausible proxy for partisan

37. See infra Part III.C.2 (using median citizen as benchmark in franchise access analysis).
38. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 304–13 (noting appeal of some of these figures). The
median voter also strikes us as a less controversial benchmark than some of the other figures
mentioned in Stephanopoulos’s earlier work, such as the median eligible voter who would have
voted in the absence of a franchise restriction, see id. at 325, or the median hypothetical voter
exposed to more event campaign spending, see id. at 338.
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alignment. 39 Photo-identification laws, for example, result in a proRepublican swing of 0–1% because their bite is felt (a bit) more acutely
by Democratic supporters. 40 Likewise, the elimination of same-day
registration produces a pro-Republican swing of about 5% because
Democrats are more likely to take advantage of the policy where it is
available. 41 On the other hand, the elimination of early voting produces
a pro-Democratic swing of about 5% because Republicans are more
inclined to cast their ballots ahead of Election Day. 42 And early closing
dates for voter registration and purges of voter rolls apparently do not
skew the electorate in either party’s favor (though they do reduce
turnout). 43
Second, a good deal of work has investigated whether the type of
primary that a state holds—the highest-profile category of party
regulation—is connected to the positions that politicians adopt. 44 Some
scholars have found that more inclusive primaries (i.e., primaries in
which more voters are allowed to participate) benefit candidates with
39. The proxy is plausible because if a franchise restriction alters the partisan composition
of the electorate, then the median actual voter diverges from the median eligible voter who would
have participated in the absence of the restriction. See id. at 325–26.
40. See Nate Cohn, Finally, Real Numbers on Voter ID, NEW REPUBLIC (July
22, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113986/voter-id-north-carolina-law-hurts-democra
ts, archived at http://perma.cc/3MV9-FQW3 (estimating that Obama’s share of the 2012 general
election vote in North Carolina would have dropped 0.3% had a photo ID law been in place); Brad
T. Gomez, Uneven Hurdles: The Effect of Voter Identification Requirements on Voter Turnout
19 (April 2008) (unpublished paper), available at http://myweb.fsu.edu/bgomez/
Gomez_VoterID_2008.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T44B-ERNZ (“[I]n states with photographic
identification requirements, the Republican Party does experience a slight (but significant)
increase in vote share.”); Nate Silver, Measuring the Effects of Voter Identification Laws,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 15, 2012 9:28 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
07/15/measuring-the-effects-of-voter-identification-laws/, archived at http://perma.cc/5VEL-86ZM
(estimating effect of a photo ID law to be a 0.4–1.2% net swing to the Republican candidate in
various states).
41. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence
from the United States, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 7, 27 (2003); Barry C. Burden et al., Election Laws and
Partisan Gains: The Effects of Early Voting and Same Day Registration on the Parties’ Vote Shares?
8 (2013) (on file with authors).
42. See Burden et al., supra note 41, at 8.
43. See Glenn E. Mitchell & Christopher Wlezien, The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter
Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate, 17 POL. BEHAVIOR 179,
186, 195 (1995). Furthermore, studies have found that felon disenfranchisement laws are harmful
to Democrats, though they have not quantified the magnitude of the pro-Republican swing. See,
e.g., Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 786–89 (2002).
44. One study also has examined the implications of sore loser laws—provisions barring
candidates defeated in primaries from running again in the general election—for politicians’ policy
stances. See Barry C. Burden et al., Sore Loser Laws and Congressional Polarization, 39 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 299, 301–19 (2014). The study found that the laws are linked to greater extremism among
both congressional candidates and representatives, and thus contribute to legislative polarization.
See id. at 319–21.
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more moderate stances, thus potentially boosting preference
alignment. 45 Other scholars, including two of us, have concluded that
primary type is largely unrelated to legislative polarization. 46 In this
literature, several studies measure voters’ as well as legislators’
preferences, typically including the former as controls in their models. 47
One noteworthy study conducted a survey of California voters,
quantified voters’ and legislators’ preferences on the same scale, and
then compared the responsiveness and alignment of the state’s U.S.
House members before and after the 2012 adoption of the top-two
primary. 48 The study found that the reform did not produce
improvement along either metric. 49
Third, numerous studies have tested whether campaign finance
regulations influence the partisan composition of the electorate or of the
legislature. 50 If the regulations have such an effect, they may shift
partisan alignment relative to a regime of unrestricted contributions

45. See, e.g., Will Bullock & Joshua D. Clinton, More a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects
of the Blanket Primary on Elected Officials’ Behavior from California, 73 J. POL. 915, 923 (2011);
Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representation, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 304, 313 (1998); Kristin Kanthak & Rebecca Morton, The Effects of Electoral Rules
on Congressional Primaries, in CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARIES AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION
116, 126 (Peter F. Galderisi et al. eds., 2001); Christopher Westley et al., Primary Election Systems
and Candidate Deviation, 30 E. ECON. J. 365, 371 (2004).
46. See, e.g., McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342–47; Thad Kousser et al., Reform and
Representation: Assessing California’s Top-Two Primary and Redistricting Commission 25 (2013)
(unpublished
paper),
available
at
http://www.columbia.edu/~jhp2121/workingpapers/
ReformAndRepresentation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N8EY-VRLM.
47. See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 45, at 922; Gerber & Morton, supra note 45, at
314–18; McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342.
48. See Kousser et al., supra note 46, at 4–26. In a top-two primary, all candidates are listed
on the same ballot, and all voters may cast a ballot for the candidate of their choice (of whatever
party). The two candidates with the most votes, irrespective of party, then advance to the general
election.
49. See id. at 22–23.
50. Another set of studies examines whether campaign finance regulations promote
competitiveness, which itself may be correlated with responsiveness. This work typically finds that
regulations do make races somewhat more competitive. See, e.g., Neil Malhotra, The Impact of
Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from Arizona and Maine, 8 ST. POL. & POL’Y
Q. 263, 274–77 (2008); David M. Primo et al., State Campaign Finance Reform, Competitiveness,
and Party Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections, in THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY:
ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 269, 278 (Michael P. McDonald & John
Samples eds., 2006); Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, Competition Policy for
Elections: Do Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?, 127 PUB. CHOICE 177, 199 (2006). For a more
extensive discussion of how campaign finance regulations affect alignment, see Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 42–48).
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and expenditures. 51 Corporate spending bans, then, result in
Democratic candidates winning 1–6% more seats in state legislatures. 52
Corporate contribution limits produce a pro-Democratic seat swing of
about 2% in state senates. 53 Other types of contribution limits
apparently have no impact on candidates’ vote margins in gubernatorial
races. 54 But higher individual contribution limits give rise to more
extreme voting records by state legislators (because individual donors
themselves are quite extreme). 55 Conversely, higher limits on donations
by political parties 56 and political action committees (“PACs”) 57 are
linked to more centrist voting records (because parties and PACs are
relatively moderate). Higher individual limits thus may reduce
preference alignment while higher party and PAC limits may increase
it. 58
51. The misalignment that may occur here is the divergence between the median actual voter
and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays. See Stephanopoulos, supra note
3, at 338–39.
52. See Andrew B. Hall, Systemic Effects of Campaign Spending 28 (Mar. 24, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120637, archived at http://
perma.cc/UT4H-AZSS; Tilman Klumpp et al., Money Talks: The Impact of Citizens United on State
Elections 9 (Univ. of Alta., Faculty of Arts, Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2012-18, 2012),
available at http://uofa.ualberta.ca/-/media/arts/departments-institutes-and-centres/economics/
wps/WP2012-18-Klumpp-Mialon-Williams, archived at http://perma.cc/4LEV-XYAR.
53. See Besley & Case, supra note 41, at 27.
54. See DONALD A. GROSS & ROBERT K. GOIDEL, THE STATES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
81 (2003); Primo et al., supra note 50, at 279.
55. See Michael Barber, Ideological Donors, Contribution Limits, and the Polarization of
State Legislatures 4, 25, 37 (Sept. 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
56. See Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, Do Party-Centered Campaign Finance
Laws Increase Funding for Moderates and Challengers? 19–20 (Jan. 8–11, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), available at https://polsci.umass.edu/uploads/profiles/sites/la-raja_ray/SPSALaRaja-Schaffner-Parties.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H4JC-U73B (finding that parties are
more likely to give money to candidates in competitive races, who are more likely to be moderate);
Ray La Raja & Brian Schaffner, Want to Reduce Polarization? Give Parties More Money, WASH.
POST MONKEY CAGE BLOG (July 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/07/21/want-to-reduce-polarization-give-parties-more-money/, archived at http://
perma.cc/E5HQ-MGAW.
57. See Barber, supra note 55, at 4, 37; see also Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the
Political Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 295–98 (2013) (also finding that PACs are relatively
moderate).
58. Another group of studies investigates whether “clean money” public financing systems
affect levels of polarization. They find that these systems either have no impact or in fact are
polarizing. See Jeffrey J. Harden & Justin H. Kirkland, Do Campaign Donors Influence
Polarization? Evidence from Public Financing in the American States LEGIS. STUD. Q.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 27) (finding negligible impact); Seth E. Masket & Michael G. Miller,
Does Public Election Funding Create More Extreme Legislators? Evidence from Arizona and Maine,
15 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 24 (2015) (finding no impact); Andrew B. Hall, How the Public Funding
of Elections Increases Candidate Polarization 19 (Aug. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/11481940/Hall_publicfunding.pdf, archived at
https:// perma.cc/CZP6-9BX8 (finding polarization).

776

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:761

Fourth, a substantial literature, to which we have contributed
in prior work, examines the implications of redistricting institutions
and criteria for partisan bias and electoral responsiveness. (Partisan
bias refers to the divergence in the share of seats that each party would
win given the same share of the statewide vote. 59 Electoral
responsiveness denotes the rate at which a party gains or loses seats
given changes in its statewide vote share. 60) As to institutions, we have
found that California’s new commission specifically, 61 and redistricting
commissions generally, 62 produce declines in bias and gains in
responsiveness. Work by other scholars, analyzing both American and
foreign commissions, confirms our findings. 63 As to criteria, one of us
has found that compactness worsens both bias and responsiveness, 64
that respect for political subdivisions improves responsiveness but
worsens bias, 65 and that respect for communities of interest has varying
effects depending on how it is measured. 66 Again, work by other
scholars corroborates the mixed record of line-drawing requirements. 67
59. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 545 (1994); Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future
of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6
ELECTION L.J. 2, 8 (2007).
60. See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 59, at 542, 544; Grofman & King, supra note 59, at
9.
61. See Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the
Citizens Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 22–24 (2012) (displaying seat-vote
curves indicating that commission-drawn plans are less biased and more responsive than prior
plans).
62. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 669, 710–15 app. tbls.2–5 (2014) (finding that commission usage reduces efficiency
differential in state legislative elections and increases responsiveness in congressional elections);
see also id. (finding that court usage also improves both partisan fairness and responsiveness).
63. See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 59, at 543, 549, 552 (American); Simon Jackman,
Measuring Electoral Bias: Australia, 1949–93, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 319, 345, 350 (1994)
(Australian); lan Siaroff, Electoral Bias in Quebec Since 1936, 4 CAN. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 66–67
(2010) (Canadian); Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State
Legislative Elections 13 (Apr. 13, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/6/9/5/pages196951/p19695
1-1.php, archived at http://perma.cc/6YVN-39FY (American).
64. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 62.
65. See id.
66. Compare id. (finding that respect for communities of interest has little effect on bias or
responsiveness), with Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903,
1944–48, 1963–66 (2012) (finding that spatial diversity, a proxy for district-community congruence,
is linked to improvements in district-level representation and plan-level bias and responsiveness).
67. See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political
Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 260–64 (2013) (finding that
randomly drawn plans with compact districts tend to favor Republicans); Richard Forgette et al.,
Do Redistricting Principles and Practices Affect U.S. State Legislative Electoral Competition?, 9
ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 151, 162–63 (2009) (finding that certain criteria increase competitiveness in

2015]

REALITIES OF REFORM

777

Finally, a range of studies have looked into how aspects of
governmental structure, in particular the voter initiative, shape the
relationship between public opinion and actual public policy. The
literature on the initiative is inconclusive, with some studies finding
that its availability makes policy more responsive to and aligned with
the public’s views, 68 and other studies concluding that it has no such
impact. 69 Despite their divergent results, these studies all employ
similar methodologies, using survey data to estimate public opinion and
legislative enactments to measure public policy. 70 The same approach
has been exploited by a handful of very recent studies to evaluate two
additional structural policies: the presence of term limits and the
professionalism of state legislatures. These works’ findings are mixed
as well, though they do hint that the policies may improve
representation. 71
Of course, this brief review does not exhaust the literature on
electoral policies and their consequences. But it should convey, at least
in broad strokes, the questions that scholars have sought to answer, the
techniques they have used, and the results of their investigations. In
our view, the existing academic work is impressive in many respects,
but it largely fails to assess preference responsiveness and alignment,
especially with respect to electoral rules that vary only at the state
state legislative races while others do not); Richard Forgette & Glenn Platt, Redistricting
Principles and Incumbency Protection in the U.S. Congress, 24 POL. GEOGRAPHY 934, 946 (2005)
(same with respect to incumbent party vote share in congressional elections).
68. See, e.g., Kevin Arcenaux, Direct Democracy and the Link Between Public Opinion and
State Abortion Policy, 2 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 372, 380–82 (2002); Barry C. Burden, Institutions and
Policy Representation in the States, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 373, 384–85 (2005); Elisabeth R. Gerber,
Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 99, 117–24 (1996);
John G. Matsusaka, Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach, 5 Q.J. POL. SCI.
133, 145–46 (2010). Matsusaka also investigates the influence of several of the electoral policies
discussed above on outcome alignment, finding no effect in most cases. See Matsusaka, supra, at
152–58.
69. See, e.g., Edward L. Lascher, Jr., Gun Behind the Door: Ballot Initiatives, State Policies,
and Public Opinion, 58 J. POL. 760, 769 (1996); Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 160–62; James
Monogan et al., Public Opinion, Organized Interests, and Policy Congruence in Initiative and
Noninitiative U.S. States, 9 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 304, 312–19 (2009); Chris Tausanovitch &
Christopher Warshaw, Representation in Municipal Government, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 23) (on file with authors) (finding no relationship); Devin
Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, Dynamic Representation in the American States, 1960–2012, at
23 (MIT Pol. Sci. Dep’t Research Paper No. 2014-22, Aug. 24, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2455441, archived at http://perma.cc/N9Q8NBWW; Boris Shor, supra note 32, at 23.
70. The one exception is Shor, supra note 32, who studies preference alignment at the
chamber level, albeit cross-sectionally.
71. See Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 160–62 (finding positive effects); Tausanovitch &
Warshaw, supra note 69, at 24 (finding no impact); Caughey & Warshaw, supra note 69, at 23
(finding ambiguous but somewhat positive effects); Shor, supra note 32, at 23 (finding no impact).
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legislative level. We explicate our critique in greater detail in the next
section.
C. Limitations
The essential problem with the existing literature is that almost
none of it measures both voters’ and representatives’ preferences. It
therefore gives little help to courts and policymakers who would like to
evaluate and formulate policies based on their implications for
preference responsiveness and alignment. Take, for instance, the vast
majority of franchise access and campaign finance studies. They
typically ask whether franchise restrictions or campaign finance
regulations alter the partisan makeup of the electorate or of the
legislature. 72 But neither voters’ partisan choices (in most elections 73)
nor legislators’ partisan affiliations are suitable proxies for policy
preferences. The binary decision of which party to vote for, or to
associate with, sheds little light on the more complex issue of political
ideology.
Similarly, the concepts of electoral responsiveness and partisan
bias that preoccupy many redistricting scholars both link parties’
legislative seat shares to their statewide vote shares. 74 These metrics
too are indicative of voters’ and legislators’ partisan inclinations, but
not of their policy views. They are helpful if one is interested in partisan
responsiveness or alignment, but much less relevant if one’s concern is
the relationship between voters’ and legislators’ policy preferences.
Unlike this work, many of the party regulation studies do
quantify legislators’ policy preferences, usually in order to see whether
representation is affected by the type of primary that a state holds. 75
Some of these studies also include measures of voters’ preferences in
72. See, e.g., GROSS & GOIDEL, supra note 54, at 81 (considering only voters’ partisan
choices); Mitchell & Wlezien, supra note 43, at 186, 195 (same); Primo et al., supra note 50, at 279
(same); Burden et al., supra note 41, at 8 (same); Gomez, supra note 40, at 19 (same); see also, e.g.,
Klumpp et al., supra note 52, at 28 (considering only representatives’ partisan affiliations); Hall,
supra note 52 (same).
73. As we discuss below, voters’ partisan choices in presidential elections actually are quite
good proxies for their political ideologies. See infra Part III.A.
74. See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 59, at 543, 549, 552 (using bias and responsiveness
to analyze redistricting issues); Jackman, supra note 63, at 345, 350 (same); Kogan & McGhee,
supra note 61, at 22–24 (same); Stephanopoulos, supra note 62, at 710–15 app. tbls.2–5 (same);
Cain et al., supra note 63, at 13 (same).
75. See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 45, at 921 (using roll call voting data to quantify
representatives’ preferences); Gerber & Morton, supra note 45, at 313–14 (using interest group
ratings to do so); McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 341–42 (also using roll call voting data); Westley,
supra note 45, at 369 (also using interest group ratings); Kousser et al., supra note 46, at 7 (using
candidate survey data to do so).
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their analyses. 76 But even in this literature, preference responsiveness
and alignment almost never are examined directly. At best, voters’
preferences are treated as controls in the models; they are not actually
used to estimate the democratic values that are of interest to us. 77 As
far as we know, only a single study in this area has calculated
responsiveness and alignment explicitly, and even this study was
limited to a single state’s reform of its primary system. 78
Lastly, the governmental structure scholarship explores how
public opinion is connected to actual policy outcomes, not to legislators’
policy preferences. 79 The scholarship gauges voters’ policy preferences
using opinion surveys, but it does not apply the same approach to
elected officials. 80 Instead, it looks to statutory compilations and other
official sources to determine which policies in fact have been enacted by
the elected branches. As a result, the studies in this field are able to
measure outcome responsiveness and alignment, but not preference
responsiveness and alignment. 81
The other weakness we perceive in the existing literature is that
most of it assesses electoral rules in congressional (or even higher-level)
elections. Very little of it aims to ascertain the rules’ implications at the
state legislative level, even though this is where the greatest policy
variation and the largest number of constituencies can be found. For
example, we are not aware of a single franchise access or governmental
structure study that carries out its analysis at the state legislative level.
Instead, these studies tend to investigate the effects of franchise
restrictions and structural factors, respectively, in statewide elections
and on statewide policy. 82 Likewise, two of us have conducted the only
study to date on the impact of primary type on state legislators’ policy
positions. 83 All of the other work in this domain has examined the link

76. See, e.g., Bullock & Clinton, supra note 45, at 922; Gerber & Morton, supra note 45, at
314–18; McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342.
77. See supra note 76.
78. See Kousser et al., supra note 46; cf. Westley, supra note 45, at 369–70 (using residuals
from regression of interest group ratings on district characteristics as proxy for preference
alignment).
79. See, e.g., Arcenaux, supra note 68, at 378 (examining state abortion policies); Burden,
supra note 68, at 380 (examining state abortion and death penalty policies); Gerber, supra note
68, at 112–13 (examining state abortion policies); Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 150–51
(examining array of state policies); Matsusaka, supra note 68, at 139–41 (same); Monogan et al.,
supra note 69, at 310 (examining overall state policy liberalism).
80. See sources cited supra note 79.
81. The one exception is again Shor, supra note32, who studies preference alignment at the
chamber level cross-sectionally.
82. See supra notes 40–43 and 68–71 (discussing these studies).
83. See McGhee et al., supra note 7.
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between primary type and U.S. House members’ views. 84 The
scholarship on redistricting is dominated by congressional studies as
well. Our own contributions are among the very few studies that have
scrutinized line-drawing institutions and criteria at the state legislative
level. 85
The lone exception to our critique is the campaign finance
literature, a good deal of which evaluates the effects of campaign
finance regulations in state legislative elections. 86 At the congressional
level, the rules on campaign contributions and expenditures are set by
federal law, meaning that there is no state-by-state variation
whatsoever. The geographic divergences that allow meaningful
conclusions to be drawn exist only at the state legislative level, and
accordingly that is where several studies in this area have cast their
attention. 87
Our assessment of the literature raises two related questions:
First, why have existing studies not sought to measure preference
responsiveness and alignment, especially at the state legislative level?
And second, are preference responsiveness and alignment even worth
measuring, given the literature’s manifest lack of interest in them? As
to the first question, there likely are two reasons why the literature has
not exhausted our subject of inquiry already. The first is that preference
responsiveness and alignment were not defined clearly until relatively
recently. For decades, political scientists focused on responsiveness
alone, typically by calculating the correlation between some measure of
public opinion and some metric of legislators’ policy views. 88 The point
that responsiveness refers to the rate of change of legislators’
preferences given some shift in voters’ preferences, while alignment
denotes the congruence of voters’ and legislators’ preferences, was not
grasped fully until the last decade or so. 89 Indeed, prominent law
84. See supra notes 44–49 (discussing these studies).
85. See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 61, at 16–25; Stephanopoulos, supra note 62, at 679–
86; see also Forgette et al., supra note 65, at 158–61; Cain et al., supra note 63, at 8–11.
86. See, e.g., Malhotra, supra note 50, at 269–71; Primo et al., supra note 50, at 274–77;
Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo, supra note 50, at 184–86; Barber, supra note 55, at 8–9; Hall,
supra note 58, at 6–7; La Raja & Schaffner, supra note 56, at 6–7.
87. See sources cited supra note 86.
88. See, e.g., Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 149 (noting that while “[t]he existing literature
establishes a high degree of responsiveness to ideology . . . it cannot usually answer questions
about congruence”); Matsusaka, supra note 68, at 136 (referring to “the conventional ‘correlation’
approach that uses preference proxies to measure responsiveness”); Shor, supra note 32, at 2
(explaining how methodological issues have “long bedeviled attempts to assess congruence at the
state level, so analysts have typically had to fall back on responsiveness as a benchmark” (internal
quotations marks omitted)).
89. Some of the studies that make this point most clearly are Lax & Phillips, supra note 32,
at 148 and Shor, supra note 32, at 2. See also supra note 32 (discussing these studies).
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professors and political scientists continue to confuse the two concepts
on occasion. 90
The second reason why preference responsiveness and
alignment have not been analyzed thoroughly, at least at the state
legislative level, is that the necessary data for such analysis previously
did not exist. 91 At the congressional level, interest groups such as
Americans for Democratic Action and the American Conservative
Union have issued ratings of legislators’ voting records for decades, 92
and in the 1980s, political scientists devised a technique for converting
roll call voting data into ideological ideal points. 93 Information on
voters’ preferences in congressional districts also has long been
available in the form of aggregated presidential election results 94 and
public opinion polling. 95 At the state legislative level, on the other hand,
the earliest ideal point estimates were generated in 2002, 96 and
reasonably complete estimates, based on roll call voting data from all

90. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 165–66 (2003)
(conflating “responsiveness to public opinion” with “align[ing] the behavior of politicians and
officials with the people’s interests”); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S.
House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 136, 138 (2001) (using “responsiveness” and “congruence”
interchangeably and referring to them as same “idea”); cf. John G. Matsusaka, Problems with a
Methodology Used to Evaluate the Voter Initiative, 63 J. POL. 1250, 1250–54 (2001) (criticizing
several political scientists for confusing responsiveness and alignment).
91. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 337 (“In the past, state politics scholars
have been hindered by the unavailability of data on policy preferences at the level of state
legislative districts.”).
92. See ACU Federal Legislative Ratings, AM. CONSERVATIVE UNION, http://
acuratings.conservative.org/acu-federal-legislative-ratings/, archived at http://perma.cc/3ATZT489 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Voting Records, AMS. FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, http://
www.adaction.org/pages/publications/voting-records.php, archived at http://perma.cc/M3KRBZW9 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
93. See, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 11–14 (1997); Keith T. Poole & Steven Daniels, Ideology, Party,
and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373, 374 (1985).
94. Every four years, the Cook Political Report publishes its partisan voter index (PVI),
which “measures how each district performs at the presidential level compared to the nation as a
whole.” David Wasserman, Partisan Voter Index, COOK POLITICAL REPORT (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://cookpolitical.com/story/5604, archived at http://perma.cc/HZM8-4V57. Political scientist
Gary Jacobson also maintains a database of presidential election results aggregated by
congressional district from 1946 to the present. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 62, at 679 n.40
(discussing this database).
95. See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton, Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in
the 106th House, 68 J. POL. 397, 397 (2006); Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency
Influence in Congress, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45, 46 (1963); Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski,
Congressional Voting by Spatial Reasoning, 2000-2010 (Oct. 11, 2012) (unpublished paper) (on file
with authors).
96. See John H. Aldrich & James S. Coleman Battista, Conditional Party Government in the
States, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 164, 165–68 (2002).
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ninety-nine state legislative chambers, were not released until 2011. 97
Similarly, it was not until 2013 that either aggregated presidential
election results or estimates of voters’ ideologies became available for
most state legislative districts. 98 And a unified database of all the
electoral policies that shape states’ political systems—and that might
be linked in some way to preference responsiveness and alignment—
has never before been assembled.
As for the second question, whether preference responsiveness
and alignment are worth investigating in the first place, we believe they
occupy a sort of sweet spot in the study of representation. Partisan
responsiveness and alignment undoubtedly are important, but even
when they are achieved, the relationship between voter and
representative may remain severely flawed. Assume, for instance, that
in one election the median voter in a district is a Democrat and so is the
candidate elected, and that in the next election the median voter and
the winning candidate both are Republicans. Assume also that after the
first election the politician’s voting record is far more liberal than the
median voter would like, and that after the second it is far more
conservative. 99 Then we have partisan responsiveness and alignment—
since the legislator’s partisan affiliation is responsive to and congruent
with the median voter’s partisan preference—but we have a troubling
lack of policy representation as well. After neither election does the
legislator even remotely share the median voter’s policy views.
Conversely, outcome responsiveness and alignment are
significant too, but they strike us as overly ambitious goals for electoral
rules to accomplish on their own. The policies that actually are enacted
by the elected branches indeed are the product, in part, of the rules that
govern the electoral system. But they also are the product of myriad
factors that are beyond the scope of these rules: politicians’ own
interests and agendas, partisan pressures inside and outside the
legislature, legislative structures and voting rules, relations between
the legislative and executive branches, and so forth. 100 Given all of these
97. See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 531; see also Bonica, supra note 9, at 367
(estimating state legislators’ ideologies based on the identities of their campaign donors); cf.
Barber, supra note 55, at 8 (“Until recently, no data existed to measure the ideology of state
legislators over time.”).
98. See McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342; Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 330.
99. This is a very plausible scenario in contemporary America—indeed it seems to be the
norm. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional
Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533, 541 (2001) (showing that distribution of legislators’ rollcall votes is far more bimodal than distribution of constituents’ opinions); Joseph Bafumi &
Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their
Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 528 (2010) (same).
100. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 360–65 (discussing these factors at length).
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factors, we think it is unrealistic to expect electoral rules to bring about
outcome responsiveness and alignment by themselves. For the same
reason, we think scholars who are interested in the effects of these rules
would do well to broaden their inquiries to other, more attainable types
of representation.
If partisan representation is not a demanding enough criterion,
and outcome representation is too demanding, then preference
representation seems just right to us. It recognizes that a democracy is
not functioning well merely because legislators’ partisan affiliations
and voters’ partisan preferences are linked. But it also does not ask of
electoral rules more than they plausibly can deliver. Its more modest
aim is simply to tether voters’ and legislators’ policy preferences, thus
directly improving the quality of representation and indirectly
increasing the likelihood of responsive and aligned policy outcomes.
This is a valuable goal, in our view, and one that is well worth further
exploration despite its neglect by the existing literature. 101 We therefore
devote the rest of this Article to our empirical analysis of electoral
policies’ effects on preference responsiveness and alignment.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our analysis begins with a description of the data we use. Most
of our information on voters’ preferences, legislators’ preferences, and
states’ electoral policies either has become available very recently, or
has never been available until now. Next, we explain our methodology
for calculating responsiveness and alignment. We estimate
responsiveness (at the chamber level) by regressing the change in the
median legislator’s preferences from one period to the next on the
change in the median voter’s preferences. We estimate alignment (at
both the district and chamber levels) by modeling legislators’
preferences as a function of their constituents’ preferences, and then
computing the resulting regression residuals. These residuals capture
the gap between the representation that would correspond to voters’
views and the representation the voters actually receive.
101. For a selection of scholars who also have recognized the importance of preference
responsiveness and alignment, see G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF
DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 122 (2000) (“In contemporary
democracies elections are supposed to establish connections that compel or greatly encourage the
policymakers to do what the citizens want.”); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 515, 526 (2003) (“[C]onstituent-representative congruence . . . is a factor in each of
the forms of representation.”); and Michael D. McDonald et al., What Are Elections For? Conferring
the Median Mandate, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2004) (“To be truly democratic, the rules for
[elections] should empower the voter median by ensuring that it is also the policy position of the
[representative].”).
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Our findings on the effects of different electoral policies can be
summarized most easily by issue area. First, among franchise access
rules, identification requirements have little impact while early voting
improves alignment. Second, among party regulations, sore loser laws
are aligning while certain types of open primaries worsen alignment
and responsiveness. Third, among campaign finance reforms, limits on
individual contributions are aligning while public financing schemes
are misaligning. Fourth, among redistricting policies, independent
commission usage is aligning, while the effects of traditional linedrawing criteria vary by electoral level. And fifth, among variants of
governmental structure, term limits are misaligning. There are other
significant results in the models as well, but these are the most robust,
in our view.
Lastly, we perform a series of robustness checks to ensure that
our findings are reliable. Specifically, we rerun our models using an
alternative measure of responsiveness; omit states for which our
estimates of presidential election results by state legislative district are
less accurate; collapse our electoral policies into a much smaller number
of categories; and replicate another political scientist’s analysis of how
chamber-level alignment is affected by a number of reforms. On the
whole, these checks strongly corroborate our results.
A. Data Sources
We noted earlier that data on voters’ preferences, legislators’
preferences, and electoral policies at the state legislative district level
previously did not exist. 102 This data now does exist, thanks to both our
own efforts and those of other scholars, and it forms the foundation of
this project. First, with respect to voters’ preferences, political scientists
Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw recently merged nine
nationwide surveys, all carried out between 2004 and 2011, with a total
of 275,000 respondents. 103 They then carried out a cutting-edge
statistical procedure known as multi-level regression and poststratification, which enables accurate public opinion estimates to be
generated even for relatively small populations. 104 State legislative
districts are among the geographic units for which Tausanovitch and

102. See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
103. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 332.
104. See id. at 333–36; see also Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate
Public Opinion in the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 107, 109–10 (2009) (describing this technique in
more detail).
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Warshaw produced estimates of citizens’ policy preferences. 105 These
estimates would be ideal for our purposes were it not for the fact that
they are available only for a single point in time (the entire 2004–2011
period).
Because of this limitation, we also collected presidential election
results aggregated by state legislative district, which do vary
temporally. Presidential election results are widely considered an
excellent proxy for voters’ policy preferences because they too are the
product of voters’ underlying ideological views. In an article on the
measurement of district-level public opinion, for instance, Warshaw
and Jonathan Rodden observe that “[e]mpirical researchers in need of
a catchall one-dimensional proxy for district ideology have typically
turned to the district-level presidential vote.” 106 Similarly, the
correlation between Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s public opinion
estimates and 2008 presidential vote shares is higher than 0.9 at the
state level. 107 We therefore feel comfortable using presidential data as
our principal measure of voters’ preferences (though we also run certain
models using Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s estimates).
In prior work, one of us assembled presidential election results
aggregated by state legislative district for 2000, 2004, and 2008. 108 A
group of Daily Kos analysts gathered this data for 2012. 109 For 1992 and
1996, lastly, we submitted freedom of information requests to all fifty
105. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 337–39 (using these estimates to analyze
representation in state legislatures).
106. Christopher Warshaw & Jonathan Rodden, How Should We Measure District-Level
Public Opinion on Individual Issues?, 74 J. POL. 203, 211 (2012). For examples of political
scientists using district-level presidential vote shares as a proxy for voters’ policy preferences, see
Ansolabehere et al., supra note 99, at 540; Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of Office:
Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 131 (2002); Seth
E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving Two Masters: Using Referenda to Assess Partisan Versus Dyadic
Legislative Representation, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1, 3–4 (2011); and McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342.
But see Georgia Kernell, Giving Order to Districts: Estimating Voter Distributions with National
Election Returns, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 215, 216–19 (2009) (noting that unless districts’ ideological
variances are equal, presidential vote shares may be misleading). To the extent the presidential
vote is a noisy proxy for actual district ideology, our coefficient estimates are biased downward,
and any findings that do attain statistical significance are more credible.
107. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 335; see also Masket & Noel, supra note
106, at 14 (also finding correlation above 0.9); Kousser et al., supra note 44, at 11 (finding
correlation as high as 0.94 between estimates of district ideology and presidential vote shares).
108. This was Rogers. See McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342 (using this data). This dataset
is comprehensive except that it is missing Gore-Bush figures for the New Mexico Senate and the
Arkansas, Colorado, and Mississippi state legislatures, and Kerry-Bush figures for the Florida and
Mississippi state legislatures.
109. See Daily Kos Elections’ Statewide Election Results by Congressional and Legislative
Districts, DAILY KOS (July 9, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2013/07/09/1220127/-Daily-Kos-Elections-2012-election-results-by-congressional-and-legislativedistricts, archived at http://perma.cc/W697-NBKN.
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states, thereby obtaining the requisite results for several jurisdictions.
For states that were unable to produce the data, we used county-level
presidential election results to estimate the results by state legislative
district. 110 This procedure has been found to be quite accurate,
especially for states with large numbers of counties, and thus is a
reasonable alternative when the actual data is unavailable. 111 Our
resulting database of presidential election results aggregated by state
legislative district is by far the most comprehensive of its kind.
Second, with respect to legislators’ preferences, political
scientists Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty recently compiled roll call
voting data for all ninety-nine state legislative chambers from 1993 to
2013. 112 They then merged this data with candidates’ responses to a
policy survey administered by Project Vote Smart over the last two
decades. 113 In combination, these two datasets enabled Shor and
McCarty to calculate ideal points for all state legislators who served
during the relevant timeframe. 114 These ideal points serve as our core
measure of legislators’ policy positions. They capture, on a single leftright axis, the ideologies of legislators in all states over nearly two
decades.
Unfortunately, the Shor and McCarty scores do not vary over
time. As they acknowledge, “Because we bridge legislatures over time
by estimating a single ideal point for each legislator, we do not allow for
ideological drift by individuals.” 115 However, the invariant nature of
these scores is not overly worrisome since legislators usually maintain
consistent positions over time 116 and representation still may shift via
110. More specifically, we disaggregated the county-level data to the census block group level
on the basis of counties’ and block groups’ adult populations. We then aggregated back up to state
legislative districts using district maps made available by the census to determine which block
groups are located in which districts. See Cartographic Boundary Shapefiles—State Legislative
Districts—Upper and Lower, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/
cbf/cbf_sld.html, archived at http://perma.cc/MRV5-A4GJ (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). This is the
same procedure that other political scientists have employed as well. See Shor & McCarty, supra
note 8, at 543; Carl Eoin Klarner & C. Lockwood Reynolds, Using County Data to Estimate State
Legislative District Characteristics (2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with authors).
111. See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 543 (finding correlation above 0.8 for Texas state
legislative districts’ estimated and actual presidential election results); Klarner & Reynolds, supra
note 110, at 10 fig.1 (showing that correlation between estimated and actual presidential election
results is higher than 0.7 for most states’ legislative districts).
112. See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 531; see also Data, MEASURING AM. LEGISLATURES,
http://americanlegislatures.com/data/, archived at http://perma.cc/T3SJ-4WE6 (last visited Feb.
12, 2015) (containing most recent update to Shor and McCarty scores).
113. See Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 532–33.
114. See id. at 533–37.
115. Id. at 533.
116. See Bafumi & Herron, supra note 97, at 526; Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in
Congress!, 131 PUB. CHOICE 435, 435 (2007) (presenting “evidence that members of Congress die
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replacement. 117 As detailed below, we also take into account the scores’
invariability by including only newly elected legislators in our districtlevel analyses. That way each legislator (with each fixed ideal point)
appears only once in our models. 118
We note as well that we considered using the ideal points that
Adam Bonica recently generated using the identities of candidates’
campaign donors. 119 These ideal points do vary over time as candidates’
donor bases shift. 120 But because of the relatively small number of
people who give to each state legislative candidate, the estimates are
not very reliable at this low electoral level. They can distinguish crudely
between liberal and conservative candidates, but unlike the Shor and
McCarty scores, they do not enable more fine-grained distinctions
between types of liberalism and conservatism. 121 Accordingly, despite
their appealing temporal dynamism, we do not further employ the
Bonica ideal points in this Article.
Our final category of data is information about states’ electoral
policies over the 1992–2012 period. How these policies influence
responsiveness and alignment, of course, is the key question we seek to
answer in this Article. We consulted a wide range of primary and
secondary sources to ascertain which states implemented which policies
at which times. As in our earlier review of the literature, we sorted the
policies into five groups: (1) franchise access, (2) party regulation, (3)
campaign finance, (4) redistricting, and (5) governmental structure. 122
Below we provide information on the policies we coded within each
group as well as the sources we relied upon to do so: 123
•

Franchise access: requirements to show nonphoto identification
before voting; requirements to show photo identification before
voting; requirements to prove citizenship before registering to

in their ideological boots,” that is, “adopt an ideological position and maintain that position
throughout their careers”).
117. Since Shor and McCarty calculate separate ideal points for each legislator, if a given
politician is replaced by another, then representation indeed may shift at the district level.
118. See infra Part III.B.
119. See Bonica, supra note 9, at 370–76.
120. See id. at 379–82.
121. See id. at 376 (noting correlations of only about 0.6 between Shor and McCarty and
Bonica estimates of parties’ median legislators’ ideal points in state legislatures).
122. See supra Part II.B.
123. It is worth noting again that no electoral policy database as extensive as ours has been
assembled previously. The most similar existing databases are by Besley & Case, supra note 41,
at 18 and Matsusaka, supra note 68, at 139–41.
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vote; availability of early voting; availability of same-day voter
registration; and felon disenfranchisement rules. 124
•

Party regulation: type of party primary (open, semi-open, closed,
semi-closed, or nonpartisan); and sore loser laws banning
candidates defeated in primaries from running again in general
election. 125

•

Campaign finance: individual contribution limits; corporate
contribution limits; union contribution limits; PAC contribution
limits; corporate spending bans; union spending bans; and
public financing. 126

•

Redistricting: criteria used for redistricting (compactness,
respect for political subdivisions, respect for communities of
interest, respect for prior district cores, and/or incumbency
protection); and institution responsible for redistricting (unified
government, divided government, commission, or court). 127

124. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) provides data on most of these
policies. See Absentee and Early Voting, NCSL (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/69F6-E9YE;
Same Day Voter Registration, NCSL (May 6, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/same-day-registration.aspx,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/J366-BDTQ;
Voter
Identification Requirements | Voter ID Laws, NCSL (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/7MBC-354R. The best source
for early voting rules is Non-Precinct Place Voting, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 2, 2010),
http://www.pewstates.org/research/reports/non-precinct-place-voting-85899378759, archived at
http://perma.cc/29UJ-UPXN. The best source for felon disenfranchisement rules is NICOLE D.
PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT
REFORM, 1997–2010 (2010), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/
We
vr_expandingthevotefinaladdendum.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/3QDP-ZN47.
supplemented all of our sources for this project by consulting archived versions of online materials
as well as current and prior compilations of state laws.
125. For data on primary type, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 339–41. For data on sore
loser laws, see Burden et al., supra note 44, at 33–37.
126. NCSL is the best source for campaign finance laws in effect in recent years. See
Contribution Limits: An Overview, NCSL (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/research/electionsand-campaigns/campaign-contribution-limits-overview.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/62X685ES; Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, NCSL (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/5NN7-YS4Z. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is the best source for earlier
years. See, e.g., FEC, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 2002: A SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAWS WITH QUICK REFERENCE CHARTS (2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/
pubrec/cfl/cfl02/cfl02.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/92HA-J5FN. For data on expenditure
limits in particular, see Klumpp et al., supra note 52, at 16.
127. Stephanopoulos has coded these redistricting policies in a prior work. See
Stephanopoulos, supra note 62, at 690 n.90. NCSL again is the best secondary source for these
policies. See NCSL, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 161–217 (2009), http://redistrictingonline.org/
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Governmental structure: availability of voter initiative;
availability of legislator recall; presence of legislative term
limits; and level of legislative professionalism. 128
B. Methodology

In combination, our three categories of data—on voters’
preferences, legislators’ preferences, and electoral policies—allow us to
estimate the effects of different reforms on alignment and
responsiveness. The first two types of data enable the calculation of
alignment and responsiveness at the district and chamber levels. Once
these concepts have been quantified, the third kind of data makes
possible assessments of actual policy impact. Below we explain in more
detail our strategies for measuring alignment and responsiveness and
then investigating causality.
Both alignment and responsiveness, again, refer to certain
relationships
between
voters’
preferences
and
legislators’
129
preferences. Alignment denotes the congruence of these preferences,
while responsiveness captures the rate of change of legislator ideology
given a shift in constituent ideology. 130 But while these definitions are
clear in the abstract, complexities arise when voters’ and legislators’
preferences are gauged using different techniques. After all, who can
say what the relationship should be between voting record (our metric
uploads/Redistrictinglaw2010.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/F3NA-QPE8;
NCSL,
REDISTRICTING LAW 2000 (1999), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/
redist/red2000/red-tc.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/KZ6V-WVXR. For useful data on the 2000
and 2010 cycles, see ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/, archived at http://
perma.cc/VKG9-HRP7 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). For useful data on the 1990 cycle, see Action on
Redistricting Plans: 1991-99, NCSL (Oct. 24, 2003), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/
departments/scr/redist/Redsum/Action1990.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/BJU2-GL7F.
128. Voter initiative data is available at Initiative and Referendum States, NCSL (Sept. 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/V3AQ-9ETP. Term limits data is available at The Term-Limited States,
NCSL (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limitsstates.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/R77U-Q4PT. Recall data is available at Recall of State
Officials, NCSL (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-ofstate-officials.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/9CUG-LEEQ. Peverill Squire has quantified
legislative professionalism using criteria such as salary and benefits, time demands of service, and
staff and resources. See PEVERILL SQUIRE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES:
COLONIES, TERRITORIES, AND STATES, 1916–2009, at 266–316 (2012); Peverill Squire, Measuring
State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 211, 213, 220–
21 (2007).
129. We are referring here (as throughout this Part and the next) to preference alignment and
responsiveness, and not their other variants.
130. See supra Part II.A.
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of legislator ideology) and the presidential vote (our usual metric of
constituent ideology)? Theories of representation suggest there should
be some connection, but they do not specify how strong this link should
be. In particular, voters may expect different behavior from their state
legislator than from their president, and so may cast ballots based on
different criteria in races for each office, thus rendering our metrics only
weakly related.
In all of the models we run, we respond to this concern by
focusing on relative rather than absolute levels of alignment and
responsiveness. Even though we may not know the ideal relationship
between voting record and the presidential vote, we still may draw
conclusions based on how this relationship changes after reforms are
enacted. 131 For instance, if alignment increases after a given policy is
introduced (even with all the necessary controls included), then we may
surmise that the policy improves representation despite our lack of
certainty about the optimal level of alignment. In addition, when we
calculate alignment and responsiveness, we incorporate our divergent
metrics of voters’ and legislators’ preferences as follows.
First, for alignment at the district level, we begin by regressing
legislator ideology (captured by the Shor and McCarty scores) on voter
ideology (captured by the presidential vote or the Tausanovitch and
Warshaw scores). We consider only state house members in our models,
because the staggered terms of many state senates make them more
difficult to analyze. We also consider only newly elected legislators
because otherwise, due to the static nature of the Shor and McCarty
scores, incumbents would be included multiple times but always with
the same ideal points.
This analysis reveals the overall relationship between voters’
and legislators’ preferences. In other words, it indicates how a typical
legislator would vote given the ideological views of her constituents.
Once this relationship has been determined, the computation of
alignment is straightforward. All we have to do is compare a legislator’s
expected ideal point (given her voters’ preferences) with her actual ideal
point. The difference between these two figures is known as a regression
residual—and the smaller it is, the more closely aligned a legislator is
with her constituents.
It would be preferable, of course, if our metrics of voters’ and
legislators’ preferences used the same scale. Then they could be
compared directly, without any need to consider regression residuals.
131. See John D. Griffin, Party Polarization and Representation 10 (2013) (unpublished
paper) (on file with authors) (noting that in studies that “focus[ ] on relative representation over
time,” various kinds of measurement error “will not affect our inferences”).
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But only voters’ and legislators’ current preferences can be placed on
the same axis (by surveying voters about issues that their legislators
already have addressed through their roll call votes or through polls of
their own). 132 Voters’ and legislators’ past preferences cannot be
standardized since the necessary voter surveys simply were not
conducted. Accordingly, we have no choice but to use our residual
technique to measure alignment. Fortunately, this technique has been
employed previously by numerous scholars and is accepted widely in
the field. 133 It also produces very similar results to the direct
comparison of voters’ and legislators’ preferences when they are
available on the same scale. 134
Second, we calculate alignment at the chamber level—that is,
how closely aligned the median legislator is with the median voter in
the state—through a variant of the above procedure. 135 But this time
the basic units of our analysis are not individual districts but rather
chambers in their entirety. We also consider all legislators here, not
just newly elected ones, because our aim is to identify the median of the
body as a whole. We thus regress the median legislator ideal point on
the statewide presidential vote to determine the overall relationship
between voter and legislator ideology at the chamber level. We then
compare the expected median legislator ideal point with the actual
median legislator ideal point to ascertain the level of alignment for each

132. For examples of studies using voter surveys to place voters’ and representatives’ current
preferences on the same scale, see Bafumi & Herron, supra note 99, at 523–25, Cheryl Boudreau
et al., Legal Interventions in the Market for Political Information: Lessons from Survey
Experiments in Local Elections 19–21 (2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with authors), Stephen
A. Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 59, 64–68 (2009),
Kousser et al., supra note 46, at 7, and Shor & Rogowski, supra note 95, at 6–14.
133. See, e.g., Jon R. Bond et al., Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections,
47 J. POL. 510, 519–20 (1985); David W. Brady et al., Primary Elections and Candidate
Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 79, 84
(2007); Daniel M. Butler, Discounting Disagreement: Experimental Evidence on How
Legislators’ Rationalizations Contribute to Polarization 16 (2013) (unpublished paper), available
at
www.danielmarkbutler.com/uploads/1/7/6/8/17688231/discounting_constituent_views.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/J4ET-RFHE; Westley et al., supra note 45, at 369–70. But see
Matsusaka, supra note 90, at 1250–56 (noting that this method makes a potentially inappropriate
assumption as to the linear relationship between legislator and district ideology).
134. Using a range of datasets in which voters’ and legislators’ preferences were on the same
scale, we obtained very high correlations (typically above 0.85) between the regression residuals
and the congruence scores produced by subtracting the voters’ preferences from the legislators’
preferences. However, since the relationship is not perfect, our residual technique does introduce
some additional noise compared to the direct comparison of voters’ and legislators’ preferences.
135. For one of the few studies to examine state-level alignment, see Bafumi & Herron, supra
note 99, at 534–38.
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body. Again, the smaller the gap between the expected and actual ideal
points, the better the chamber’s alignment, and vice versa. 136
Lastly, the invariancy of the Shor and McCarty scores means
that we cannot calculate responsiveness at the district level.
Responsiveness refers to the change in legislator ideology given a shift
in voter ideology, but all of the legislators in our database have the same
ideal points throughout their careers. Fortunately, this difficulty does
not apply to the analysis of responsiveness at the chamber level. 137 At
this level, the ideal point of the median legislator does vary over time—
due to retirements, reelection losses, and redistricting—meaning that
shifts are possible in our metrics for both voters’ and legislators’
preferences. We thus assess responsiveness by regressing the change in
the median legislator ideal point from one year to another on the change
in the statewide presidential vote over the same period. 138 And because
presidential elections take place only every four years, we use only
voters’ preferences in those years and legislators’ preferences in the
immediately subsequent years. 139
To make our methodology easier to grasp, Figure 1 shows
graphically how we calculate alignment and responsiveness. The first
chart displays legislator ideal point versus the district-level
presidential vote for a random sampling of districts in our database,
with a best fit line indicating the overall relationship between the
variables. 140 Our measure of district-level alignment is simply the
vertical distance between each legislator’s ideal point and the best fit
line. Analogously, the second chart illustrates median legislator ideal
point versus the state-level presidential vote for all chambers in our

136. Because this method uses all legislators in each chamber (with their static ideal points),
it is biased against finding effects for electoral policies. Any effects we do find thus are more
credible.
137. At the chamber level, one can conceive of both temporal responsiveness (the kind we
study) and spatial responsiveness, i.e., the extent to which legislator ideal points change as one
moves geographically from less to more conservative districts. See John D. Griffin, Electoral
Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis, 68 J. POL.
911, 913–14 (2006) (distinguishing between “cross-district” and “within-district” responsiveness).
We focus on temporal responsiveness because it better captures the value that Issacharoff and
Pildes laud in their work. See supra Part II.A.
138. This approach allows us to estimate responsiveness for subsets of our data as well. We
simply include in the model only the states or years in which we are interested.
139. This approach necessarily limits our data substantially. Also, as with chamber-level
alignment, by including all legislators in our analysis, we bias it toward null results and so
increase our confidence in any non-null results. See supra note 136.
140. As noted earlier, this chart includes only newly elected legislators. It also includes a
random sampling of districts, rather than all districts, for ease of presentation. For a similar chart
using only 2004 data (and imputed rather than actual presidential vote shares), see Shor &
McCarty, supra note 8, at 543.
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database, with a best fit line included as well. 141 Our measure of
chamber-level alignment is the vertical distance between each median
legislator’s ideal point and the best fit line. And the third chart depicts
the change in median legislator ideal point from one year to another
versus the change in the state-level presidential vote over the same
period, again with a best fit line. Our measure of chamber-level
responsiveness is the coefficient that results when the first shift is
regressed on the second. 142
With our estimates of alignment and responsiveness in hand, we
turn to the second stage of our analysis: determining how the metrics
are affected by different electoral policies. We divide the policies into
the same five categories as before—(1) franchise access, (2) party
regulation, (3) campaign finance, (4) redistricting, and (5) governmental
structure—though we also assess all of the policies in unison after
concluding our more fine-grained examination. For each category, we
carry out four OLS regressions: two for district-level alignment (one for
Democrats and one for Republicans), a third for chamber-level
alignment, and a fourth for chamber-level responsiveness.
With respect to alignment, all of our models use the absolute
value of the regression residual as the dependent variable. 143 This
strategy ensures that deviations in both a liberal and a conservative
direction are treated analogously. All of our models also include the
relevant policies as the key independent variables. And we consider
Democrats and Republicans separately in our district-level models to
allow for the possibility of partisan differences in representation. With
respect to responsiveness, the change in the median legislator’s ideal
point is the dependent variable, and the key independent variables are
the interactions of the policies with the change in the statewide
presidential vote. The resulting interaction terms capture the policies’
effects on the sensitivity of the median legislator’s ideal point to shifts
in the statewide presidential vote. That is, the terms capture chamberlevel responsiveness itself. 144

141. As also noted earlier, the median ideal points are computed using all legislators’ scores.
For similar charts using 2000, 2004, and 2008 data, see id. at 544.
142. And as noted earlier as well, we calculate responsiveness using only voters’ preferences
in presidential election years and legislators’ preferences in the following years.
143. Because the Shor & McCarty scores range from –3 to 3, the absolute values of the
regression residuals theoretically may vary from 0 to 6, as may the treatment effects of the various
policies we examine. In practice, the largest treatment effects are on the order of -0.5 or 0.5.
144. For examples of other scholars using very similar modeling strategies to study
responsiveness, see Griffin, supra note 137, at 916, and Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 69,
at 20.
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It also is important to note that each model includes fixed effects
for years and states. These fixed effects mean that each model features
a full “difference-in-differences” design. The coefficient for each policy
thus indicates the impact of the reform relative to both the state’s own
prior history and developments in other states. This design controls for
any time trends as well as any fixed differences among states due to
politics, economics, demography, culture, or other factors. The design
also capitalizes on the remarkable temporal and geographic variation
of the policies in our database. It therefore brings us closer to the social
scientific ideal of identifying the true causal effect of reform. 145

145. For a good discussion (and application) of fixed effects regression, see McGhee et al.,
supra note 7, at 343. Fixed effects are more appropriate here than random effects because the
relevant clusters (years and states) are “of intrinsic interest,” and not merely “examples of possible
clusters.” SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, 1 MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL
MODELING USING STATA 97 (3d ed. 2012). Fixed effects also are a more rigorous test than random
effects and so less likely to give rise to statistically significant findings. We make our analysis
more rigorous still by clustering standard errors in our models. Despite our best efforts, of course,
we cannot be as sure of causality as we would like. It is possible, for instance, that the effect we
attribute to a particular policy change actually is due to a simultaneous change in some other
aspect of a state’s policy, politics, or culture. We encourage researchers to continue exploring
creative ways of addressing this inferential challenge.
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C. Results
We next present the results of our analysis. We begin with some
summary statistics about alignment and responsiveness across the
states and over time. These statistics provide a wealth of information
about state legislative representation in the contemporary United
States. We then proceed to our five electoral policy categories. For each
category, we lay out hypotheses drawn from the existing literature
about the effects of different reforms, describe the results of our models,
and comment on their implications for the hypotheses. We conclude
with a series of more comprehensive models that incorporate (almost)
all of the policies in our database. These models capture the
consequences of states’ electoral regulatory environments in their
(near) entirety.
1. Summary Statistics
Starting with district-level alignment, Figure 2’s first chart
shows the alignment of Democratic and Republican legislators in each
state over the entire time period of our analysis. 146 The closer a state is
located to the chart’s origin, the more aligned its legislators tend to be
with their constituents by our metric, and vice versa. One notable point
is that just about every state’s legislators are quite misaligned. No
state’s legislators are, on average, particularly near the origin. A second
insight is that both Democrats and Republicans typically are
misaligned in the direction of the ideological extremes. That is,
Democrats tend to be too liberal for their constituents, and Republicans
tend to be too conservative. There is very little misalignment toward
the ideological center. 147
Third, the parties’ misalignment is not symmetric. There are
several states in which the average Democrat is almost perfectly
aligned (e.g., Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma), and several in

146. To generate these state estimates, as well as the year estimates in Figure 2’s second
chart, we regressed the real (as opposed to absolute) residuals on fixed-effect variables for states
and years separately for Democrats and Republicans. The predicted values from these regressions
are displayed in the charts. This procedure helps account for changes in the composition of the
sample, as not every state is represented in every year. For the state estimates, we generated
predicted values for 2008, the last year in which virtually all states were present in the data. For
the year estimates, we averaged all of the relevant state fixed-effects coefficients.
147. This finding is consistent with other studies of alignment. See, e.g., Bafumi & Herron,
supra note 99, at 528 (“What is most striking . . . is the extremism of members of the U.S. House
as compared to state median voters . . . .”); Kousser et al., supra note 46, at 40 (finding that
members of House of Representatives from California almost universally are more extreme than
median voter in their districts).
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which she is extraordinarily misaligned (e.g., Arizona, California,
Idaho, Wyoming). In contrast, the misalignment of the mean
Republican varies much less. There are only a handful of states in which
she is highly aligned (e.g., New York) or misaligned (e.g., California).
Fourth, there seems to be a strong relationship between legislative
polarization (which does not involve voters’ views) and misalignment
(which does). States such as Arizona and California have very high
levels of both polarization and misalignment, while states such as
Delaware and Rhode Island score much better on both metrics. 148 This
suggests that legislative polarization is the product not of a polarized
electorate, but rather of legislators who diverge from their more centrist
constituents. 149
Figure 2’s second chart displays the trends in mean district-level
alignment from 1992 to 2010. 150 From 1992 to 2006, the alignment of
Democratic and Republican legislators was roughly constant and about
equal in magnitude. During this period, there was no particular
asymmetry in alignment, nor any major fluctuations in its levels. But
from 2006 to 2010, Republican legislators became notably more
misaligned with their constituents, while Democratic legislators
became somewhat more aligned. Unlike in the past, there now is a clear
partisan asymmetry in alignment, with Democratic legislators more
accurately reflecting voters’ preferences than their Republican
counterparts. 151
Turning to alignment at the collective level, Figure 3’s first chart
indicates its values for all states and over all available years. The
distribution is surprisingly balanced; there are almost exactly as many
states where the median legislator is too liberal for the median voter as
there are where she is too conservative. Another intriguing pattern is
the tendency of states governed by Democrats to have overly liberal
148. For data on polarization in state legislatures, see McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 342,
and Shor & McCarty, supra note 8, at 546.
149. This conclusion is bolstered by the earlier finding that state legislators typically are more
extreme than their constituents. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. However, the
relationship between polarization and misalignment likely is more complex than a simple
correlation and warrants further investigation.
150. We do not have enough voting record data from the 2013 sessions to produce reliable
estimates for legislators elected in 2012.
151. This result is confirmed by another recent study of alignment, which also found that
today’s Republican state legislators are more ideologically distant from their constituents than are
Democratic representatives. See Shor, supra note 32, at 11–15. However, the trends in
polarization, at least at the national level, are quite different. Republican members of Congress
have been growing steadily more conservative since the late 1970s, while their Democratic
colleagues have been growing slightly more liberal for about half a century. Nothing in particular
changed in 2006. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (Jan. 19, 2014),
http://www.voteview.org/political_polarization.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/F4PW-E79S.
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median legislators (e.g., California, Connecticut, Massachusetts), and
of Republican-run states to have overly conservative median members
(e.g., Michigan, Missouri, Ohio). It is possible that a party’s control of
the legislature is associated with a sort of over-reaction, in which the
median member veers further in the party’s direction than the median
voter would like. 152
The distribution for chamber-level responsiveness, depicted in
Figure 3’s second chart, is not as symmetric. In general, the median
legislator has been either moderately sensitive to changes in the
statewide presidential vote (in the states on the right side of the chart)
or largely insensitive (in the states on the center-left). But in a handful
of outliers (e.g., Georgia, Indiana, Missouri), the median legislator has
been negatively responsive; as public opinion swings one way, she has
moved in the opposite direction. Also notable is the lack of correlation
between alignment and responsiveness at the chamber level. States
with high alignment scores do not stand out for their responsiveness,
nor do states with high responsiveness scores stand out for their
alignment. Indeed, the state with the lowest responsiveness in the
country, Georgia, has been one of the best in terms of alignment.
Lastly, Figure 4’s two charts present the trends in chamber-level
alignment and responsiveness over the last two decades. 153 (There are
fewer data points in the second chart because, as noted earlier, we use
only presidential election years and ensuing legislative sessions to
calculate responsiveness. 154) Unlike with district-level alignment, no
obvious patterns are discernible in these charts. If one squints, the
median legislator seems too conservative in the 1990s, too liberal in the
2000s, and too conservative again today, but the deviations are quite
small. Responsiveness also has hovered around almost exactly the same
value for the entire period of our analysis. At least at this level of
aggregation, state legislative representation in America appears
remarkably static.

152. See Shor, supra note32, at 16 (finding that “Republican-held chambers are more
conservative than state opinion, while Democratic-held chambers are mostly, but not always, more
liberal than their states”); cf. Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 157 (observing a similar pattern
with respect to outcome alignment).
153. Again, we have too little voting record data to show results for 2012/2013. See supra note
150.
154. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
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Figure 2: District-Level Alignment by State and over Time
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Figure 3: Chamber-Level Alignment and Responsiveness
by State
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Figure 4: Chamber-Level Alignment and Responsiveness
over Time
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2. Franchise Access
Having presented the summary statistics for alignment and
responsiveness, we now proceed to the key question that this Article
seeks to answer: how representation is affected by different electoral
policies. We begin our discussion with laws that alter people’s access to
the franchise. These laws include both measures that make it more
difficult to vote (such as identification requirements, proof-ofcitizenship requirements, and the disenfranchisement of felons) and
measures that make voting easier (such as early voting and same-day
registration). 155
In the literature, photo-identification requirements are the most
thoroughly studied of these policies, and the prevailing view is that they
have only a marginal impact on the parties’ electoral performances. 156
A plausible hypothesis, then, is that the requirements also have little
effect on the electorate’s policy views, and so little effect on
representation. Scholars have found as well that the adoption of sameday registration produces a mild pro-Democratic swing, while early
voting and felon disenfranchisement modestly benefit Republicans. 157
Since these policies do seem to have partisan consequences, it is
reasonable to expect them to influence representation too. If the
electorate’s partisan preferences change because of the policies, it would
not be surprising for its policy preferences to shift in tandem.
Unfortunately, we cannot use the presidential vote here to
measure constituent opinion. Franchise access policies, unlike all the
other laws we study, affect who votes in the first place (rather than how
legislators represent their constituents). It thus is illogical to examine
the policies’ impact on the representation of actual voters. The whole
point of the policies is that they may change who these voters are. In
place of the presidential vote, then, we use the Tausanovitch and
Warshaw scores, which capture the ideology of citizens rather than of
voters. 158 Since franchise access policies do not affect citizenship, they
are capable of influencing how citizens are represented. The policies are
endogenous to the electorate but exogenous to the citizenry as a whole.
155. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing franchise access policies in our
database).
156. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
158. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 330–31 (noting that their “supersurvey”
includes “275,000 citizens in all 50 states”). Our use of the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores
means that, in this part, we are studying the representation of the median citizen, not the median
voter. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 325 (noting that franchise access restrictions can
produce “divergence between the median actual voter and the median eligible voter who would
have gone to the polls in the absence of the restrictions”).
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While the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores make it possible to
assess franchise access policies, they have the drawback of being
available only for the 2004–2011 period in its entirety. 159 We therefore
are limited to studying district-level and chamber-level alignment
during this timespan. We also cannot study responsiveness at all,
because we have no change over time in our measure of constituent
opinion. 160 Despite these constraints, we believe the analysis we carry
out is quite valuable. Franchise access policies have attracted a good
deal of attention in recent years, but their implications for
representation have yet to be examined.
As shown in Figure 5, then, 161 we find that the restrictive
policies in our database have ambiguous effects on district-level and
chamber-level alignment. At the district level, strict requirements for
nonphoto identification are misaligning for Democrats, while proof-ofcitizenship requirements are aligning for them. At the chamber level,
strict requirements for photo identification are misaligning, flexible
requirements for nonphoto identification are weakly misaligning, 162
and flexible requirements for photo identification are aligning. Our
findings are more intelligible for policies that expand access to the
franchise. None of these policies has a significant impact at the chamber
level, while early voting is aligning for both Democrats and Republicans
at the district level.
On balance, these results support the hypothesis that
identification requirements have a minor impact on representation.
Just as they barely alter the parties’ vote shares, so too do they have
either unclear effects or none at all on district-level and chamber-level
alignment. However, the measures’ chamber-level consequences
provide some cause for concern (or, at least, further study). While the
relevant coefficients do not all point in the same direction, they do
suggest that identification requirements are more likely to be
misaligning than aligning. Perhaps the requirements produce
noncongruence that is too minor to register at the district level, but that
aggregates into more substantial misalignment at the chamber level.
The results also bolster the hypothesis that early voting
influences representation. The practice is linked to improved alignment
159. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 6, at 332.
160. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (explaining that responsiveness cannot be
calculated unless measures of constituent and legislator opinion both vary over time).
161. We use coefficient charts rather than data tables to present the results of all of our
regressions. The dot for each policy represents its regression coefficient, while the lines to each
side indicate the standard errors (at the 5% significance level).
162. We refer to effects as “weak” when they are significant only at the 10% level. For details
on different identification requirements, see Voter Identification Requirements, supra note 124.
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for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level (though not at
the chamber level). A possible explanation is that early voting increases
turnout and so shrinks the gap between the median actual voter (to
whom legislators may be especially attentive) and the median citizen
included in Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s surveys. In other words, early
voting may make the median citizen more electorally significant to
legislators, and so motivate them to better align their positions with
hers. 163
However, the results do not substantiate the hypotheses that
same-day registration and felon disenfranchisement have significant
impacts on representation. These measures do not influence alignment
by either Democrats or Republicans at either the district or chamber
levels. Why not? With respect to same-day registration, one possibility
is that the voters who take advantage of the policy are more likely to be
Democrats, but not more likely to be liberals. The partisanship of the
median voter thus might shift even as her ideology remains constant. 164
And with respect to felon disenfranchisement, opinion surveys tend to
exclude felons from their coverage. 165 So felons’ views likely are omitted
from the Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores that serve here as our
benchmark of constituents’ preferences.

163. Though this hypothesis would not explain why early voting has a partisan valence in
favor of Republicans. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
164. Cf. Burden et al., supra note 41, at 6–7 (observing that franchise access policies have
various electoral and ideological effects that interrelate in complex ways).
165. See Daniel Horn, Survey Research on the Political and Economic Attitudes of Felony
Offenders in North Carolina 1 (2012) (unpublished paper) available at http://
www.eventscribe.com/2012/ASAH2R/assets/pdf/49962.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V4HC9CJV (“Felon populations are generally excluded from social and economic surveys distributed
both nationally and sub nationally.”).
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3. Party Regulation
We look next at regulations of political parties: measures that
specify the type of primary a party must hold or that restrict candidates’
access to the ballot itself. Our database includes several kinds of more
inclusive primaries (semi-closed, semi-open, open, and nonpartisan), 166
as well as one ballot access requirement: sore loser laws, which ban
candidates who lose in the primaries from running again in the general
election. 167 As noted earlier, the literature on primary type is mixed,
with studies coming to different conclusions as to whether it is linked
to legislative polarization. 168 In contrast, the lone study on sore loser
laws found that they increase polarization. 169 Assuming that
representation and polarization are negatively related, 170 we are left
with no clear hypothesis as to the impact of primary type on alignment
and responsiveness. But we might expect sore loser laws to cause scores
on both metrics to decline.
Unlike in the previous section, 171 here there is no obstacle to
using the presidential vote as our measure of voters’ preferences. To the
extent party regulations affect representation, they do so by changing
the stances taken by legislators—not by altering the general
electorate. 172 Since the presidential vote varies over time, we thus are
able to analyze both alignment and responsiveness in this domain. The
same is true for all of the other issue areas we cover, and so, for the sake
of brevity, we do not mention our data usage again.
As Figure 6 illustrates, we find, on the whole, that more
inclusive primaries either do not influence representation or actually
make it worse. Semi-closed, semi-open, open, and nonpartisan
primaries all are misaligning for Democrats at the district level.
Nonpartisan primaries also weakly reduce responsiveness at the
chamber level (though they are aligning for Republicans at the district
level). We further find that sore loser laws are aligning for both
Democrats and Republicans at the district level. The provisions are
aligning at the chamber level as well.
166. The details of the different primary types are not important here, but they are covered
in depth in McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 339–41.
167. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing party regulations in our database).
168. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 44.
170. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (discussing summary statistics that
provide support for this assumption).
171. See supra Part III.C.2.
172. Though different primary types obviously alter the primary electorate—indeed, that is
their essential aim. One thus could not use primary election results to study the impact of primary
type on the representation of the primary electorate.
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Our results provide strong support for the more skeptical side of
the debate over primary type. This camp contends that more inclusive
primaries either have no impact on polarization or in fact are
polarizing. 173 Likewise, we find that these policies are neutral at best in
terms of representation, and quite harmful at worst. Why do more
inclusive primaries not attract more moderate voters and so result in
more centrist candidates winning their parties’ nominations? A large
political science literature offers several answers. 174 The primary
electorate does not vary much by primary type; primary voters do a poor
job distinguishing between centrist and extreme candidates; and the
donors and activists who drive campaigns view extremism (on their own
side of the aisle) as a virtue, not a vice. 175 Our results do not shed light
on which of these mechanisms is most potent. But any of them would
explain why more inclusive primaries fail to live up to their advocates’
hopes.
As for our finding that sore loser laws improve alignment, it is
squarely at odds with the hypothesis that they worsen representation.
One reason for the discrepancy may be that our analysis is at the state
legislative level, while the earlier work on the provisions examined
their impact on congressional polarization. But even if sore loser laws
are polarizing at the state legislative level too, it might be possible, at
least in theory, for them simultaneously to be aligning.
Take a heavily conservative district in a state without a sore
loser law, and suppose that the loser in the Republican primary decides
to run again in the general election. Suppose also that, with two
Republicans splitting their party’s vote, a moderate Democrat squeaks
to victory. Then substantial misalignment ensues between the
Democrat and the district’s conservative median voter. But the
Democrat likely reduces polarization by occupying the ideological center
of the legislature. If this scenario is plausible, then it is not hard to see
how a sore loser law would increase both alignment and polarization.
The law would prevent the mismatch between the moderate Democrat
and the conservative median voter. But it also would negate the
Democrat’s centripetal influence in the legislature. 176 Further research

173. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
174. See McGhee et al., supra note 7, at 338–39 (discussing this literature at length).
175. See id.
176. The same analysis, of course, applies if a moderate Republican squeaks to victory in a
heavily liberal district in the absence of a sore loser law. We also are aware that sore loser laws
may have different electoral consequences in different kinds of districts. For more on these
provisions, see generally Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1013 (2011).
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is necessary, of course, to determine if these effects are more than mere
conjecture.
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4. Campaign Finance
Campaign finance regulations are the third type of policy in our
database, and they can be subdivided further into three groups: limits
on contributions (by individuals, corporations, unions, or PACs), bans
on expenditures (by corporations or unions), 177 and public financing
schemes of varying generosity. 178 A set of very recent studies assess
these policies’ effects on polarization, generating a series of hypotheses
for us to test. 179 First, the studies find that individual donors are
ideologically extreme and that limits on individual contributions reduce
polarization. 180 So we also might expect these limits to increase
alignment and responsiveness. 181 Second, the studies find that public
financing schemes are polarizing because the public funds typically are
tied to the receipt of donations from extreme individual donors. 182 So we
might expect these schemes to worsen representation. And third, the
studies find that most PACs are relatively moderate and that limits on
PAC donations increase polarization. 183 So we might expect these limits
to worsen representation as well.
As Figure 7 indicates, limits on individual contributions improve
district-level alignment for both Democrats and Republicans, but are
weakly misaligning at the chamber level. Limits on corporate
contributions are misaligning for Republicans at the district level, but
weakly increase chamber-level responsiveness. Bans on corporate
spending are weakly aligning for Republicans at the district level, and
aligning at the chamber level. Limits on union contributions are
aligning for Republicans at the district level. PAC limits weakly reduce
chamber-level responsiveness. And partial public financing is
177. These bans are no longer constitutional after Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–
62 (2010).
178. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing campaign finance regulations in
our database). The vast majority of states have disclosure requirements as well. We omit these
requirements from our analysis because they are ubiquitous and because we do not expect them
to have any connection to alignment or responsiveness.
179. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 50
(manuscript at 42–48) (discussing these studies in depth). We focus on the polarization studies
rather than the literature on the partisan effects of campaign finance regulations, see supra notes
50–52 and accompanying text, because they are related more closely to our subject matter of
representation.
180. See supra notes 55, 58, and accompanying text.
181. The reason for this expectation is, again, the apparent negative relationship between
polarization and representation. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 58.
183. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the polarizing effects of
limits on corporate or union contributions have yet to be investigated. The literature thus does not
give rise to any hypotheses on these limits’ implications for alignment and responsiveness.
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misaligning for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level,
while full public financing is misaligning for Republicans at the district
level.
These results are consistent (for the most part 184) with our
hypotheses as to how individual contribution limits and public
financing affect representation. Individual limits reduce polarization
and, as expected, improve alignment. When legislators’ ideal points
shift toward the center after donations from extreme individual donors
are curbed, the outcomes are a smaller gap between the parties at the
legislative level—and a smaller gap between legislators and their
constituents at the district level. Similarly, public financing
exacerbates polarization and, as expected, worsens alignment.
Candidates’ need to raise money from extreme individual donors, in
order to qualify for public funds, motivates them to migrate toward the
ideological fringes. The consequences are a more polarized legislature
as well as legislators who are less aligned with their constituents.
On the other hand, our findings provide scant support for the
hypothesis that PAC limits worsen representation. The coefficients for
these measures do not rise to statistical significance in any of our
alignment models, and only weakly suggest a decline in responsiveness.
Since past studies conclude that PAC limits are only modestly
polarizing, 185 these marginal results are not overly surprising. We also
had no a priori expectations as to the effects of corporate or union
restrictions 186—but if we had, they would not have been confirmed by
our equivocal outcomes. In the models in which they are significant,
corporate contribution limits worsen district-level alignment for
Republicans but weakly improve responsiveness; while in the models in
which they are significant, corporate spending bans boost district-level
alignment for Republicans and chamber-level alignment. Likewise,
union limits rise to statistical significance in just one of our models
(Republican district-level alignment). Corporate and union restrictions
plainly are worth further study, but for now the safest conclusion is that
their implications for representation remain uncertain.

184. The main exception is our finding that individual limits are misaligning at the chamber
level. Because this finding is relatively weak (with significance only at the 10% level), and is
contradicted by our district-level results, we put relatively little stock in it.
185. See Barber, supra note 55, at 38 (finding that effects of PAC limits on polarization are
substantially smaller than those of individual limits).
186. See supra note 183.
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Figure 7: Campaign Finance Regression Results
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5. Redistricting
Redistricting is our fourth issue area, and it includes two kinds
of policies: line-drawing criteria (compactness, respect for political
subdivisions, respect for communities of interest, respect for prior
district cores, and incumbent protection) and line-drawing institutions
(legislature, independent commission, or court). 187 As to criteria, the
existing literature is inconclusive but suggests that their effects may
vary by electoral level. At the district level, requirements such as
compactness and respect for political subdivisions may improve
representation by making constituencies more intelligible to voters and
legislators. 188 But at the chamber level, these criteria may weaken
representation by increasing the likelihood of plans that favor a
particular party: the Republicans, whose supporters usually are
distributed more efficiently when the criteria are satisfied. 189 As to
institutions, past studies find that commissions and courts tend to enact
fairer and more competitive plans than legislatures. 190 So we might
expect these bodies to be linked to heightened chamber-level alignment
and responsiveness as well.
As Figure 8 shows, compactness is aligning for both Democrats
and Republicans at the district level, and misaligning at the chamber
level. Respect for political subdivisions is aligning for Republicans but
misaligning for Democrats at the district level, and also weakly
increases chamber-level responsiveness. Respect for prior district cores
is weakly aligning for Democrats at the district level, and misaligning
at the chamber level. Incumbent protection is misaligning for
Democrats at the district level, and weakly aligning at the chamber
level. Commission usage is misaligning for Democrats and Republicans
at the district level, and aligning at the chamber level. And court usage
is aligning for Democrats at the district level.
On balance, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that
redistricting criteria improve representation at the district level but
weaken it at the chamber level. Compactness and respect for prior
district cores fit this narrative especially well, as they both increase
district-level but reduce chamber-level alignment. In contrast, the story
187. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing redistricting policies in our
database). We also include the presence of divided government in our models, but do not discuss it
further since it is not an actual policy choice.
188. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1471–72 (2012) (discussing
relevant studies).
189. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
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is more ambiguous for requirements such as respect for political
subdivisions and incumbent protection. To the extent the narrative
holds, it reveals yet another tradeoff in a domain that already is full of
them. By adhering to traditional criteria when they craft districts, linedrawers promote closer alignment between voters and their individual
representatives—a laudable goal. But in so doing, line-drawers often
produce a divergence between the state’s median voter and the
chamber’s median legislator—an obviously unwelcome outcome.
Whether to employ traditional criteria turns out to be a Hobbesian
choice.
Fortunately, the institutional question is not as vexing. The
results support the hypothesis that independent commissions (though
not courts 191) improve representation at the chamber level. District
plans drawn by commissions indeed feature higher levels of chamberlevel alignment than plans drawn by the elected branches. This finding
means that the benefits of commissions are not limited to the fairer
conversion of the parties’ votes into legislative seats. 192 Rather, the
benefits extend to the congruence of the pivotal legislator with the
state’s median voter. Institutional choice makes a substantive
difference.

191. We also are unsure what to make of our district-level findings that commissions are
misaligning for Democrats and Republicans and courts are aligning for Democrats. We had no
hypotheses as to these institutions’ district-level effects, but they are worth further investigation.
192. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (noting that redistricting by commissions
improves responsiveness).

2015]

REALITIES OF REFORM
Figure 8: Redistricting Regression Results

815

816

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:761

6. Governmental Structure
Our fifth and final set of policies relate to governmental
structure generally rather than election law specifically. These
measures include the availability of the voter initiative, the ability to
recall legislators, the presence of legislative term limits, and the level
of legislative professionalism. 193 Of these policies, the voter initiative is
the most extensively researched. 194 But the prior literature on the
initiative’s effects on alignment and responsiveness is indeterminate, 195
leaving us with no clear hypothesis as to its impact on representation.
The literature on term limits and legislative professionalism is mixed
as well (though mildly positive), 196 and no study to date has examined
the link between the legislator recall and representation. We thus have
no strong expectations as to these policies’ consequences either.
As Figure 9 illustrates, the voter initiative is misaligning for
Democrats at the district level, and aligning at the chamber level. It
also reduces chamber-level responsiveness. The legislator recall is
misaligning at the chamber level. Term limits are misaligning for both
Democrats and Republicans at the district level. And legislative
professionalism is misaligning for Democrats at the district level.
These results tend to bolster the pessimistic position in the
debate over the voter initiative. While we do find that the initiative is
aligning at the chamber level, we also find that it is misaligning for
Democrats at the district level and reduces chamber-level
responsiveness. We cannot conclude that the initiative improves
representation overall, especially since we have no theoretical reason to
discount the adverse findings. Apparently, the mechanism through
which the initiative is said to boost alignment and responsiveness—
legislators voting in accordance with their constituents’ views in order
to avoid reversal by referendum 197—operates rather fitfully.
The results also help resolve the dispute over the
representational effects of term limits. At the district level, both
Democrats and Republicans are somewhat more misaligned with their
constituents in states that limit legislative terms. Our models do not
explain why term limits exert this negative influence on alignment. But
193. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (describing governmental structure provisions
in our database).
194. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
195. See id.
196. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
197. See Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 158 (observing that the threat of being overruled
“may then spur elected officials to make changes in their policy choices as a means of avoiding a
ballot measure”).
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they do suggest that the critics’ claims—that term limits prevent
legislators from developing valuable expertise and reduce their
incentives to attend closely to their constituents—are more persuasive
than the rejoinders. 198
Lastly, the results are no help to backers of greater legislative
professionalism either. Democrats are more misaligned with their
constituents in states with more professional legislatures, while
professionalism has no impact in any of the other models. How might
legislative professionalism reduce district-level preference alignment
while perhaps increasing chamber-level outcome alignment (as the
literature hints)? 199 The question requires further study, but one
possibility is that parties in states with more professional legislatures
are more disciplined and more motivated to attain (and retain) majority
status. 200 Such parties might pressure legislators to cast votes that are
out of sync with the legislators’ own constituents, but that are
congruent with the views of the state’s median voter. In this way, the
parties simultaneously would promote district-level misalignment and
chamber-level alignment.

198. See Lynda W. Powell et al., Constituent Attention and Interest Representation, in
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE CASE OF TERM LIMITS 38, 38–39 (Karl T.
Kurtz et al. eds., 2007) (discussing reasons why term limits might improve or weaken
representation).
199. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
200. See Lax & Phillips, supra note 32, at 158 (noting that “[s]eats in professional chambers
are also more valuable”).
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Figure 9: Governmental Structure Regression Results
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7. Electoral Policies in Combination
We conclude this Part by examining most of the electoral policies
in our database in unison. These sorts of “kitchen sink” models serve as
robustness checks for our earlier results, while also illuminating the
operations of states’ electoral systems in their full complexity. To avoid
overwhelming readers with extraneous detail, we focus on the key
points that emerge from these broader models. We also omit franchise
access policies from our analysis because, as noted above, they cannot
be assessed using the presidential vote. 201
Beginning with party regulations, we find that they have largely
the same effects that we identified previously. As Figure 10 indicates,
more inclusive primaries have no impact or worsen alignment or
responsiveness in most models, while sore loser laws are aligning at
both the district and chamber levels. It is worth noting, though, that
semi-open and nonpartisan primaries now are slightly aligning for
Republicans at the district level. It thus is possible that these measures’
consequences vary by party. Next, our findings for campaign finance
regulations also hold steady for the most part. Individual contribution
limits remain aligning for Republicans at the district level, though they
no longer rise to statistical significance for Democrats. Similarly, both
types of public financing continue to be misaligning for Republicans at
the district level. However, full public financing now is aligning for
Democrats at the district level.
Third, our results for redistricting policies essentially are
unchanged from before. Line-drawing criteria such as compactness
again are aligning at the district level and misaligning at the chamber
level. (Though the district-level effects no longer register for respect for
prior district cores.) Likewise, the use of independent commissions to
draw district lines again improves chamber-level alignment. Lastly, the
kitchen sink models require us to amend some of our assessments of
governmental structure provisions. The voter initiative no longer
worsens alignment at the district level or responsiveness at the
chamber level, but remains aligning at the chamber level. So its impact
on representation may be more positive than we surmised earlier.
Analogously, term limits no longer are misaligning at the district level
and indeed are mildly aligning at the chamber level. So their influence
also may be more beneficial than we suggested previously.

201. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
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Figure 10: Electoral Policies Regression Results
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8. Robustness Checks
While the kitchen-sink models are our most important
robustness checks, we also validate our results in four additional ways.
First, we rerun our responsiveness models using different dependent
and independent variables. 202 Specifically, we use the change in the
median legislator ideal point divided by the change in the statewide
presidential vote as the dependent variable, and the electoral policies
themselves (not their interactions with the change in the statewide
presidential vote) as the independent variables. 203 This approach makes
responsiveness itself the dependent variable, and it means that the
policies’ coefficients can be interpreted as their direct effects on
responsiveness. The approach also confirms that electoral reforms have
next to no impact on responsiveness. In all of these models, not a single
policy attains statistical significance. Responsiveness thus seems
almost impossible to influence no matter how it is measured.
Second, we exclude from our district-level alignment analysis
states for which our estimates of the presidential vote aggregated by
state legislative districts are less accurate. 204 In their work on using
county-level election results to approximate district-level results, Carl
Klarner and Lockwood Reynolds conclude that the procedure is
substantially less reliable in states whose county-district “concordance”
is 0.25 or below. 205 We thus remove these largely northeastern states
(Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont) from our
database, 206 and we then rerun our district-level alignment models. Our
results are largely unchanged. In fact, almost all of the coefficients are
similarly signed and sized, and the only notable differences are that
open primaries now are aligning for Republicans, individual
contribution limits no longer are aligning for Republicans, commission
usage no longer is misaligning for Republicans, and the legislator recall

202. The results of all of the models discussed in this part are available on request.
203. For more information on our baseline responsiveness specification, see supra notes 137–
39, 144, and accompanying text.
204. As noted earlier, we obtained actual presidential election results aggregated by state
legislative district for some states and years and had to estimate them for others. See supra notes
107–10 and accompanying text.
205. See Klarner & Reynolds, supra note 110, at 10 fig.1 (showing that correlation between
estimated and actual district-level results falls below 0.7 when concordance is 0.25 or below).
“Concordance” is a quantitative measure of “correspondence between state legislative and county
lines.” Id. at 3.
206. See id. at 8 tbl.1 (listing states by average county-district concordance over 1968–2010
period).
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now is aligning for Democrats. Given the large number of policies in the
models, these strike us as fairly minor variations.
Third, to ensure that our findings are not being driven by slight
policy differences, we consolidate our array of reforms into the following
categories: all franchise restrictions (identification requirements, proofof-citizenship requirements, and felon disenfranchisement); all
franchise expansions (early voting and same-day registration); all open
primaries (semi-closed, semi-open, open, and nonpartisan); all
organizational campaign finance limits (on corporations, unions, and
PACs); all public financing (partial and full); all constraining
redistricting criteria (compactness and respect for political
subdivisions, communities of interest, and prior district cores); all
independent redistricting institutions (commissions and courts); and all
structural limits on the legislature (voter initiative, legislator recall,
and term limits). We then rerun our models with these broader policy
groupings as the key independent variables.
Our results paint a familiar picture. For example, franchise
restrictions continue to have ambiguous effects at the district level,
while franchise expansions continue to be aligning for both parties.
Similarly, the records of open primaries and public financing remain
poor, worsening alignment at the district level. And redistricting
criteria continue to be misaligning at the district level too. On the other
hand, organizational campaign finance limits now seem more
attractive, improving alignment at the district level for Democrats and
at the state level. But independent redistricting institutions now seem
less appealing, with no significant impacts in any of the models. The
overall substantive story thus changes only modestly when we shift
from dozens of individual policies to a handful of policy categories.
Lastly, we replicate the alignment analysis recently carried out
by Shor using same-scale data for voters’ and legislators’ preferences. 207
Our rationale for the replication is that if we obtain similar results
using our regression residual technique, then it must make little
difference whether representation is studied using same-scale data or
regression residuals. Shor’s dependent variable is the distance of each
party’s median member in each state legislative chamber from the
state’s mean voter in 2008. 208 His independent variables are the
ideology of the median Republican member, chamber competitiveness,
district magnitude, the use of a traditional party organization, and
three electoral policies that we previously coded: the voter initiative,

207. See Shor, supra note 32, at 19–23.
208. See id. at 19.
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term limits, and legislative professionalism. 209 We also are able to code
Shor’s remaining independent variables. And we substitute our
regression residual measure for Shor’s dependent variable, this time
calculated only for 2008 and for parties’ rather than chambers’ median
members.
Like Shor, we find that median Republican ideology is strongly
associated with greater party median misalignment. 210 Our
confirmation of this “by-now familiar result” is quite encouraging. 211
Also like Shor, we find that use of a traditional party organization is
linked to a significant improvement in alignment, and that the voter
initiative, term limits, and legislative professionalism do not reach
customary levels of statistical significance. 212 However, Shor concluded
that chamber competitiveness “very slightly” improves alignment,
while we discern no such effect. 213 Shor also concluded that district
magnitude worsens alignment, while it does not attain significance in
our model. 214 Still, the similarities between our analysis and Shor’s are
much more conspicuous than the differences. They lead us to the
conclusion that, indeed, representation may be evaluated effectively
using our regression residual technique.
*

*

*

Having reviewed the results of our various models and
robustness checks, it is worth reiterating that they are suggestive
rather than definitive. More work is needed to determine with sufficient
confidence how electoral policies affect representation in contemporary
America. Indeed, in the above discussion we have tried to flag areas in
which our conclusions are more tentative, 215 and below we describe
several worthwhile sequels to this Article that would add to the
reliability of our findings. 216 But it also is important to stress that our
results are the product of a rigorous research design that comes close to
allowing truly causal claims to be made. 217 The results certainly can be
209. See id. at 19–20.
210. See id. at 23.
211. Id. at 20.
212. See id. at 23. Legislative professionalism is significant at the 10% level in our model, in
the same misaligning direction as in Shor’s. See id.
213. Id. at 20. In fact, chamber competitiveness is significant at the 10% level in a misaligning
direction in our model.
214. See id. at 23.
215. See supra notes 149, 176, 186, 191, 200, and accompanying text.
216. See infra Part IV.C.
217. See supra Part III.B.
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refined (and we hope they will be), but they are robust enough already
to give rise to clear implications for courts, policymakers, and
academics. It is to these implications that we turn in the next Part.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Beginning with courts, then, our findings are most useful in
cases where parties argue explicitly that challenged policies should be
upheld because of their positive effects on representation. Such cases
arise with some regularity, and our findings give courts the necessary
tools to assess claims of this sort. More ambitiously, to the extent that
courts are persuaded by either the alignment or responsiveness
theories, our results permit them to start putting the theories into
operation. Case outcomes would shift substantially in some areas if
courts were to focus on representational impact (e.g., campaign finance
and redistricting), while they would be largely unaffected in others (e.g.,
franchise access and party regulation).
Next, our results have even plainer implications for
policymakers. If they agree that alignment and responsiveness are
compelling values, they should enact policies that promote them and
repeal policies that undermine them. In brief, this would mean passing
sore loser laws, early voting, individual contribution limits, and
independent redistricting commissions; and eliminating public
financing schemes, term limits, and inclusive primaries. Lastly, our
findings hold different lessons for political scientists and law professors
(our two academic audiences). For political scientists, this project gives
rise to an exciting new research agenda. There are many ways to test
and extend our analyses, all of them worth pursuing. For law
professors, our results offer the first practical assessment of a pair of
theories that lie at the heart of election law. Our results also suggest
that, whatever the normative appeal of the responsiveness theory may
be, its real-world applications are quite limited.
A. Courts
It is fair to ask whether our findings are relevant at all to courts.
The judiciary, it goes without saying, is not known for its interest in
complex empirical analysis. We believe our findings are relevant for two
reasons. First, parties in litigation sometimes assert that disputed
policies should be sustained because of their positive impact on
representation. In these cases, courts need some way to assess the
validity of these claims. Second, courts often have expressed interest in
the alignment and responsiveness theories (and have been urged by
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commentators to commit to them more fully). 218 Because it is plausible
that courts one day might implement these theories, it is important to
know how the face of election law would change as a result.
Jurisdictions have defended policies on the ground that they
improve representation in several kinds of cases. In litigation over
ballot access requirements (such as sore loser laws), for example,
jurisdictions have argued that they “ensure that a minority of voters do
not thwart the will of the majority.” 219 That is, the provisions allegedly
prevent the misalignment that ensues if a minor candidate qualifies for
the ballot and then receives enough votes to change the election’s
outcome. Similarly, in cases involving more inclusive primaries,
jurisdictions have claimed that they make candidates “more responsive
to the views and preferences of the electorate.” 220 The measures
ostensibly shift primary voters toward the ideological center and
encourage candidates to follow suit. And in campaign finance cases,
jurisdictions have contended that regulations induce officeholders to
“decide issues [based on] . . . the desires of their constituencies” and not
“according to the wishes of those who have made large financial
contributions.” 221 Regulations, in other words, are said to tether
politicians’ voting records to their constituents’ preferences.
In all of these cases, the parties’ arguments force courts to
confront difficult empirical questions. How often do sore loser laws
prevent wrong-winner outcomes? Do candidates become more
responsive to voters when more inclusive primaries are adopted? Do
campaign finance regulations make it more likely that officeholders will
heed their constituents’ wishes? Courts need to answer these questions
to determine whether the policies in fact advance the interests asserted
by the jurisdictions. But to date, courts have had little to go on beyond
anecdotal evidence, self-serving testimony, and their own intuitions. In
its ballot access cases, for instance, the Supreme Court has not referred
to any data on the frequency of wrong-winner outcomes. Likewise, in
the Court’s inclusive primary cases, an expert report on congressional
218. For discussions of the role that alignment and responsiveness have played in the
Supreme Court’s existing doctrine, see Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 605–06 and Stephanopoulos,
supra note 3, at 316–20.
219. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 56 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that ballot access requirement
“seeks to . . . assure that the winner is the choice of a majority”).
220. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221 (1986) (noting jurisdiction’s
argument that open primary would help candidates “appeal to the independent voter”).
221. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,
528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (noting jurisdiction’s argument that contribution limits address “broader
threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors” (citation omitted)).

826

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:3:761

polarization is the only relevant evidence that has been cited. 222 And no
study of how representation is affected by money in politics has yet
appeared in the Court’s decisions.
Now, however, rigorous social scientific results are available
that bear directly on these issues. Thanks to our study, courts no longer
need to guess what the representational effects are of sore loser laws,
inclusive primaries, campaign finance regulations, and the like.
Instead, courts may consult this Article’s findings—and, we hope,
additional findings that other scholars will produce in the near future—
and assess with more confidence how electoral rules influence
alignment and responsiveness. In our view, this analysis marks a
milestone for cases in which improved representation is the state
interest submitted to justify a policy. This is an intrinsically empirical
sort of interest, and now it indeed can be assessed empirically.
While our results are most helpful in situations where litigants
refer overtly to gains in representation, they also have potentially
broader implications. In particular, were courts ever to heed scholars’
calls to adopt the alignment or responsiveness theories, then
representational impact would be a crucial issue in every electoral
dispute—not only when raised by a party. 223 Then every case would
hinge not on the balancing of rights and countervailing interests, but
rather on a policy’s effects on alignment and responsiveness. What
might election law look like if such a transformation were to occur?
Below we consider each of our five issue areas in turn, painting with a
broad brush because doctrinal details are not our main concern here.
First, the law of franchise access would change only modestly.
The
highest-profile
contemporary
restrictions,
identification
requirements for voting, generally have been upheld by courts,
including in a pair of Supreme Court decisions. 224 These provisions also
likely would be sustained by courts committed to the alignment or
responsiveness theories. As discussed above, the laws’ representational
effects are small and somewhat ambiguous. 225 Courts would not be able
to commend identification requirements, but they also would not be in

222. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 580. This report notably did not address representation at the
state legislative level.
223. See supra Part II.A (discussing structural theories that urge courts to replace rights-andinterests balancing with direct consideration of underlying representational values).
224. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (upholding Indiana
photo identification-law); see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (permitting Arizona
identification law to be used in upcoming election).
225. See supra Part III.C.2. Though if further study indicates that identification requirements
in fact are misaligning at the chamber level (as our results hint), then the measures should be
scrutinized much more closely.
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a position to strike them down due to their harmful consequences.
Neutrality would be the appropriate judicial posture. On the other
hand, courts might be more skeptical of cutbacks to early voting (which
they typically have permitted to date 226). Since early voting improves
district-level alignment, 227 its curtailment probably runs afoul of the
alignment theory.
Second, the Court’s party regulation doctrine would shift even
less. In a 2000 case, the Court struck down California’s blanket primary
and criticized more inclusive primaries that are unwanted by the
parties themselves. 228 Such primaries also would be viewed
suspiciously by courts applying the alignment theory. At both the
district and chamber levels, these measures worsen alignment
(especially for Democrats) or, at best, leave it unchanged. 229 Similarly,
the Court upheld sore loser laws in the one case it took in which they
were challenged. 230 These provisions also would be sustained under the
alignment or responsiveness theories, since they improve alignment at
the district and chamber levels while having no impact on
responsiveness. 231
Third, the law of campaign finance would undergo substantial
modification. The Court has voided certain limits on donations from
individuals to candidates, 232 as well as aggregate limits on individual
giving in an entire election cycle. 233 But individual contribution limits
improve alignment for both Democrats and Republicans at the district
level. 234 So courts likely would approve them under the alignment
theory. Conversely, the Court recently nullified Arizona’s public

226. See, e.g., N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, at 375 (M.D.N.C.
2014) (upholding cutback to early voting in North Carolina); Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d
1236, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (denying plaintiffs injunctive relief upon finding of lack of
discriminatory motivation for statute curtailing early voting in Florida).
227. See supra Part III.C.2. However, early voting does not affect chamber-level alignment.
See supra Part III.C.2.
228. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
229. Nonpartisan primaries are the one exception, as they improve Republican district-level
alignment. See supra Part III.C.3.
230. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974).
231. See supra Part III.C.3.
232. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 262–63 (2006) (voiding Vermont’s individual
contribution limit).
233. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (plurality opinion) (voiding federal
aggregate contribution limit). The Court also has struck down limits on individual expenditures.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39–51 (1976).
234. See supra Part III.C.4. On the other hand, they are weakly misaligning at the chamber
level. See id.
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financing system because it tried to equalize candidate spending. 235
Public financing schemes also would be at risk under the alignment
theory since they worsen alignment for both Democrats and
Republicans at the district level. 236 As for the Court’s landmark 2010
decision eliminating corporate and union spending bans, 237 it resists
assessment from a representational perspective. Spending bans have
ambiguous effects on alignment and responsiveness, so it is not yet
possible to reach conclusions about their validity. 238
Fourth, the Court’s redistricting doctrine would change
markedly as well. The Court tends to valorize traditional line-drawing
criteria. Compliance with them is necessary to prevail in a Voting
Rights Act suit, 239 and deviations from them are probative both of
invidious racial intent 240 and, according to some Justices, unlawful
partisan gerrymandering. 241 But while these criteria commonly
improve alignment at the district level, they more often worsen it at the
chamber level. 242 Courts thus would not afford them such positive
treatment under the alignment theory. Likewise, the Court has
declined to urge jurisdictions to adopt independent redistricting
commissions in its partisan gerrymandering cases. 243 But since these
commissions improve chamber-level alignment, 244 their enactment
would be a higher judicial priority under the alignment theory.
Finally, courts are asked only rarely to determine the lawfulness
of governmental structure provisions such as the voter initiative, the
legislator recall, and term limits. The alignment and responsiveness
235. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2829 (2011);
cf. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 745 (2008) (nullifying Millionaires’ Amendment that aimed to
equalize spending by changing contribution limits for candidates facing wealthy opponents).
236. See supra Part III.C.4. However, neither form of public financing influences chamberlevel alignment. See id.
237. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
238. See supra Part III.C.4. We are similarly unable to reach firm conclusions about the
validity of corporate and union contribution limits, the effects of which also are ambiguous. See
supra Part III.C.4.
239. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986) (making geographic compactness a
prerequisite for claims under Section 2 of Voting Rights Act).
240. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959–60 (1996) (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 916–20 (1995).
241. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 347–50 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 176–77 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242. See supra Part III.C.5. This account holds most clearly for compactness and respect for
prior district cores. See supra Part III.C.5.
243. Indeed, the only opinion to have discussed commissions at any length was Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Vieth. See 541 U.S. at 362–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting use of commissions
by “a number of States”).
244. See supra Part III.C.5. On the other hand, commissions are misaligning at the district
level. See supra Part III.C.5.
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theories therefore would have limited judicial applications in this
domain. However, in a 1995 case, the Supreme Court did hold that term
limits for congressional candidates are invalid because they are not
mentioned by the Constitution itself. 245 This outcome is consistent with
the alignment theory’s prescriptions. Since term limits worsen
alignment for both Democrats and Republicans at the district level, 246
courts should disfavor the measures on representational grounds.
We reiterate that we are offering only a preliminary sketch of
how courts might operationalize the alignment and responsiveness
theories. It goes without saying that our results must be confirmed by
other scholars before they can be relied on in litigation. It also goes
without saying that the judicial inquiry under the theories cannot be as
crude as simply voiding all policies with adverse representational
effects and upholding all policies with neutral or positive effects.
Representational impact must be combined with other valid
considerations—existing precedent, judicial capacity, compelling
nonrepresentational values, and so forth—to craft workable doctrine.
Accordingly, the above discussion should be construed as a preview of
how election law doctrine might operate if the alignment or
responsiveness theories ever became ascendant. But it is only that: a
preview, not a definitive account.
B. Policymakers
While a doctrinal revolution would have to take place before
courts could embrace the alignment or responsiveness theories, no such
pyrotechnics are necessary for them to be adopted by policymakers.
Legislators, executives, and bureaucrats who are attracted to the
representational values that underpin the theories simply could start
enacting beneficial regulations and repealing harmful ones. What
might a policy agenda aimed at optimizing representation look like?
Below we offer a tentative first draft.
We begin with the beneficial policies, ordered based on our
confidence in their effects. First, sore loser laws are the measures that
most consistently improve representation in our models, boosting
alignment at both the district and chamber levels. 247 The relatively few
states that lack them thus should give serious thought to passing them.
Second, early voting increases alignment at the district level while
245. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837–38 (1995).
246. See supra Part III.C.6. However, term limits do not affect chamber-level alignment. See
supra Part III.C.6.
247. See supra Part III.C.3.
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leaving it unchanged at the chamber level. 248 It also should be a high
priority for representationally minded policymakers. Third, individual
contribution limits raise alignment at the district level but weakly
lower it at the chamber level. 249 In our view, the stronger district-level
effects outweigh the weaker chamber-level impact and justify the
enactment of these limits. And fourth, independent redistricting
commissions worsen district-level alignment but improve it at the
chamber level. 250 Since the point of commissions is to make district
plans fairer in their entirety, we think the chamber-level result is more
important and supports the bodies’ adoption.
Next we consider the harmful policies, again arranged according
to the reliability of our findings. First, public financing systems are
misaligning in three out of four district-level models, though they have
no significant impact at the chamber level. 251 The adverse district-level
effects are enough to persuade us that these systems should be
rethought (though not necessarily rejected altogether 252). Second, term
limits also are misaligning at the district level and neutral at the
chamber level. 253 The district-level consequences again lead us to
believe that representation would be enhanced by amending or
repealing these provisions. And third, more inclusive primaries all
worsen Democratic district-level alignment, and one of them, the
nonpartisan primary, reduces responsiveness too. 254 But the
nonpartisan primary also increases Republican district-level
alignment. 255 On balance, these measures do weaken representation,
but the case against them is not airtight (and it also does not extend to
other kinds of primary reform 256).
This leaves us with a hodgepodge of policies whose effects are
either mixed (identification requirements, corporate and union
248. See supra Part III.C.2.
249. See supra Part III.C.4.
250. See supra Part III.C.5.
251. See supra Part III.C.4.
252. It is only speculation at this point, but there is reason to suppose that New York City’s
multiple-match system improves alignment by attracting a donor pool that closely resembles the
city’s population as a whole. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 50, at 47–48 (discussing relevant
studies).
253. See supra Part III.C.6.
254. See supra Part III.C.7.
255. See supra Part III.C.6.
256. See, e.g., SETH E. MASKET, NO MIDDLE GROUND: HOW INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
CONTROL NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATURES (2011) (explaining how California
candidates’ ability to cross-file in multiple parties’ primaries dramatically reduced legislative
polarization). Another reform that likely would be aligning would be eliminating the primary
altogether and allowing voters to choose among all candidates in the general election (perhaps via
instant-runoff voting).
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restrictions, traditional redistricting criteria, the voter initiative, and
the legislator recall) or neutral (same-day registration, felon
disenfranchisement, and PAC contribution limits). 257 With respect to
these policies, we cannot recommend that they be enacted by states that
lack them or eliminated by states that employ them. Representational
impact simply is not a useful metric for assessment here. At least until
further evidence is available, we thus advise policymakers to consider
these measures from perspectives other than their implications for
alignment and responsiveness.
As before, a host of caveats must be appended to this analysis.
Our results require further validation before they can serve as a
foundation for actual legislation. Even selfless policymakers care about
values other than representation, and there is no guarantee that these
values will point in the same directions as alignment and
responsiveness. And many policymakers are self-interested rather than
selfless. These individuals actively may oppose measures that improve
representation—and hence pressure them to take stances they would
rather avoid. All of these points have merit, and their upshot is that the
above policy agenda is necessarily provisional.
C. Academics
Academics are the final group for whom this Article has
important implications. The main interest of political scientists is likely
to be methodological. All of the datasets we employ—voters’
preferences, legislators’ preferences, and electoral policies—can be
refined in various ways, as can be our calculations of alignment and
responsiveness. Political scientists probably will want to probe our
techniques (and results) to see if they stand up to scrutiny. On the other
hand, we expect the response of law professors to be more theoretically
inclined. Like courts and policymakers, they may be curious about the
representational effects of different reforms. They also may want to
know what our findings mean for the validity of the alignment and
responsiveness theories. In our view, our analysis tends to bolster the
former theory and to undermine the latter.
Starting with technical refinements, we can think of ways to
improve all of our datasets and calculations. These improvements
would go far in making our results dependable enough for use by courts
and policymakers. First, with respect to voters’ preferences, it would be
desirable to have a direct measure of their policy views that changes
over time. Our usual metric, the presidential vote, only indirectly
257. See supra Part III.C.2–7.
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captures voters’ policy attitudes; 258 while the Tausanovitch and
Warshaw scores, which are drawn from opinion surveys, are temporally
static. 259 Perhaps the same statistical method that produces the
Tausanovitch and Warshaw scores could be used to generate a dynamic
measure of public opinion. (Though this would entail at least some loss
of accuracy due to the smaller number of survey respondents in each
individual year. 260)
Second, with respect to legislators’ preferences, our analysis is
hamstrung by the unavailability of reliable ideal points that vary over
time. Had such ideal points existed, we would have been able to include
all legislators, not just newly elected ones, in our alignment models, and
we would have been able to examine responsiveness at the district level
too. 261 Unfortunately, the accuracy of the Bonica scores, which are
dynamic, probably cannot be improved since the number of campaign
contributions received by each candidate cannot be increased. 262 But it
should be possible to produce a dynamic version of the Shor and
McCarty scores, as the analogous NOMINATE scores for members of
Congress are available in both static and dynamic forms. 263 Timevariant ideal points for state legislators would enable further
breakthroughs in the study of state legislative representation.
Third, with respect to the electoral policies in our database, we
coded almost all of them in binary fashion, simply noting whether or
not they were used by each state in each year. 264 This approach could
be improved by placing certain laws on a continuous spectrum. For
example, contribution limits could be assessed based on their dollar
values, 265 early voting could be gauged based on the number of days the
polls are open, and so forth. Even more ambitiously, certain laws could
be coded according to their effects rather than their existence. For
instance, the actual compactness of a state’s districts could be
258. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
260. Most of the individual surveys used by Tausanovitch and Warshaw had between 30,000
and 80,000 respondents. These are large enough numbers for public opinion estimates to be
computed for most (but probably not all) state legislative districts. See Tausanovitch & Warshaw,
supra note 6, at 332.
261. See supra Part III.B.
262. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
263. See Description of NOMINATE Data, VOTEVIEW (July 13, 2004), http://
www.voteview.com/page2a.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/GK48-28PY (explaining differences
between D-NOMINATE, W-NOMINATE, and DW-NOMINATE scores, all of which are derived
from congressional roll call votes).
264. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. The one exception is legislative
professionalism, which is coded on a continuous scale. See supra Part III.C.6.
265. For an example of a study taking this approach, see Barber, supra note 55, at 30–31.
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considered instead of the presence of a compactness requirement, or the
use of the legislator recall instead of its mere availability. It would not
be surprising if a more sophisticated treatment of policies yielded more
robust results.
Lastly, alignment and responsiveness can be calculated in
several ways, and it would be helpful to know whether our findings are
sensitive to our choice of techniques. As long as voters’ and legislators’
preferences are on different scales, an alternative to our regression
residual approach is to rescale the preferences so they have the same
distributions. Then voters’ and legislators’ scores simply can be
compared to one another to determine their proximity. 266 Another
option (though not one that can be applied retrospectively) is to survey
voters using questions that their legislators already have answered
through their roll call votes. Then common-space ideal points can be
produced for voters and legislators, allowing alignment to be computed
directly, without any rescaling or residuals. 267 And we have limited
ourselves in this Article to temporal responsiveness, but the concept
also can be understood spatially. It would be interesting to find out how
legislator ideology changes as voter ideology shifts from district to
district (not from year to year). 268
These refinements are very important, and we plan to
implement several of them in the near future (hopefully joined by other
scholars). But legal academics likely are less interested in
methodological details, and more concerned about the substantive and
theoretical implications of our analysis. We already have covered the
substantive lessons in our discussions of courts and policymakers, and
do not repeat them here. 269 At a theoretical level, the first key point is
that the alignment and responsiveness theories indeed can be made
empirically useful. To date, these theories have operated on a relatively
abstract plane—exalting certain representational values, criticizing
approaches that neglect these values, and offering few specific

266. For an example of a study taking this approach, see Griffin, supra note 131, at 10–11.
We prefer our regression residual approach because it does not make arbitrary assumptions about
how voters’ or legislators’ preferences are distributed.
267. For examples of studies taking this approach, see supra note 132 and accompanying text.
This method requires the resources to conduct large enough surveys to generate voter ideal points
at the desired electoral levels. It also can be used only to investigate current (as opposed to
historical) representation.
268. For examples of studies examining spatial responsiveness, see Griffin, supra note 137,
at 913–15; and Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 69, at 17–20. As noted earlier, we focus on
temporal responsiveness because it corresponds better to the value animating the Issacharoff and
Pildes theory. See supra note 137.
269. See supra Part IV.A–B.
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prescriptions. 270 But now the theories can begin providing practical
benefits to a range of actors: to judges who want to decide cases in
accordance with them, to leaders who hope to enact sound policies, and,
yes, to legal academics who would like to argue with facts and not just
norms. Now the theories have progressed from the conceptual to the
concrete.
By shedding empirical light on normative issues, this Article is
the latest in a long line of election law scholarship. As Pamela Karlan
has explained, it is common in the field for courts (or academics) to
announce a sweeping new principle, and then for social scientists to step
into the breach to operationalize it. 271 This is what happened after the
Supreme Court enshrined the one-person, one-vote rule in the 1960s;
the calculation of malapportionment began at once. 272 It also is what
took place after the Court made racial polarization in voting the
linchpin of Voting Rights Act claims in the 1980s; empiricists rushed to
compute polarization in elections throughout the country. 273 The same
sequence is unfolding here. Academics have asserted that the central
concern of election law should be the impact of different rules on
alignment and responsiveness. And this Article, for the first time, tries
to put some empirical meat on these normative bones.
The second key point for law professors is that the alignment
and responsiveness theories are not equivalent from a practical
standpoint. Many electoral policies have positive or negative effects on
alignment—for both Democratic and Republican legislators, at both the
district and chamber levels. 274 In contrast, almost no policies have any
influence on responsiveness. In all of the domain-specific models we
ran, only a single reform, the voter initiative, had a statistically
significant impact, and even this result evaporated in the kitchen-sink
model. 275 On the whole, it is fair to say that responsiveness does not
budge in either direction due to the policies with which states
experiment. It is serenely impervious to reform.

270. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
271. See Pamela S. Karlan, Answering Questions, Questioning Answers, and the Roles of
Empiricism in the Law of Democracy, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (2013) (“[L]egal doctrine has
asked a series of questions that social scientific methods are well positioned to answer.”).
272. See id. at 1272–73.
273. See id. at 1273–76.
274. See supra Part III.C.2–7.
275. See supra Part III.C.2–7. A few more policies attained statistical significance at the 10%
level in at least one of our models: the semi-open primary, the nonpartisan primary, corporate
contribution limits, PAC contribution limits, and respect for political subdivisions. See supra Part
III.C.2–7; see also Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 69, at 20–25 (also finding that institutions
have little impact on responsiveness at municipal level).
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Why is this the case? The third chart in Figure 1, showing
change in median legislator ideal point versus change in the statewide
presidential vote, provides at least a partial explanation. 276 As the chart
illustrates, there is almost no relationship between the two variables.
Sometimes when a state’s electorate shifts in a Republican direction,
the pivotal legislator becomes more conservative. But sometimes the
pivotal legislator becomes more liberal, and even more often her
ideology does not change at all. Weak and erratic responsiveness is the
norm, at least at the chamber level. Given this reality, it is not overly
surprising that very few policies have significant effects on
responsiveness. It simply is too low and too unpredictable to be
influenced much by reform.
It is possible that this picture would change if responsiveness
could be analyzed at the district level. 277 Perhaps the far larger number
of districts (relative to chambers) would permit the impact of different
policies to be detected more clearly. 278 For the time being, however, our
conclusion is that the responsiveness theory is much less useful than
the alignment theory. Unlike the alignment theory, it cannot be relied
upon to distinguish between sound and unsound policies, or between
doctrines that should be kept and ones that should be discarded. If
nothing affects responsiveness, then nothing can be praised for
heightening it or criticized for dampening it. To be clear, this is a
practical objection to the responsiveness theory, not a normative one.
The representational ideal may well be a legislator whose positions shift
swiftly in response to changes in public opinion. But this ideal is not
much help if there is no way to promote it or to undercut it.
V. CONCLUSION
The most notable development in election law over the last
generation has been the emergence of the responsiveness and
alignment theories. These theories reject conventional rights-andinterests balancing in favor of direct examination of electoral policies’
implications for key representational values. But, until now, the
theories have been seriously deficient. They have provided no way for
276. The second chart in Figure 4, showing the trend in chamber-level responsiveness over
time, largely confirms this interpretation. Responsiveness barely shifts from year to year,
suggesting it is mostly immune to changes in the electoral environment. See supra fig.4.
277. It also is possible that the picture would change if a reliable time-variant measure of
legislator ideology were available. Our use of a time-invariant measure biases our responsiveness
scores toward zero.
278. With respect to alignment, notably, we obtained more significant results in our districtlevel models than in our chamber-level ones.
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anyone to tell how reforms affect responsiveness and alignment. They
have been caught in clouds of abstraction.
This Article is an attempt to rectify this flaw. For the first time,
we computed responsiveness and alignment scores for many states over
many years, and catalogued all of the electoral policies in effect during
this period. We then explored how the policies actually influence
responsiveness at the chamber level and alignment at both the district
and chamber levels. Our results hold valuable lessons for courts,
policymakers, and academics. Even more importantly, they make it
possible to begin operationalizing the theories—to begin converting
what have been purely normative contentions into practical guidance
for interested parties. We recognize that more work remains to be done
before a topic as complex as representational impact is understood fully.
But the Article still takes a useful first step in this direction. It starts
to pull the theories down from the clouds.

